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11.1 Introduction and Overview
The wave of ﬁnancial globalization since the mid-1980s has been marked
by a surge in capital ﬂows among industrial countries and, more notably,
between industrial and developing countries. While these capital ﬂows
have been associated with high growth rates in some developing countries,
a number of countries have experienced episodic collapses in growth rates
and signiﬁcant ﬁnancial crises over the same period, crises that have ex-
acted a serious toll in macroeconomic and social costs. As a result, an in-
tense debate has emerged in both academic and policy circles about the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration on developing economies. But much of the
debate has been based on only casual and limited empirical evidence.
The objective of this paper is to provide an assessment of empirical evi-
dence on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization for developing economies.
The paper will focus on a couple of related questions: (a) does ﬁnancial
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of the IMF or IMF policy.globalization promote economic growth in developing countries, and (b)
what is its impact on macroeconomic volatility in these countries?
While this paper does not deal directly with poverty issues, its main sub-
ject—the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization on economic growth and vola-
tility—has important indirect eﬀects. First, as documented by several
empirical studies, economic growth has been the most reliable source of
poverty reduction. Moreover, in theory, there are several channels through
which increased ﬁnancial ﬂows could help reduce poverty. As discussed
later in the chapter, some of these channels are related to the growth-
enhancing eﬀects of increased ﬁnancial ﬂows. For example, augmentation
of domestic savings, reduction in the cost of capital, increase in productiv-
ity through transfer of technological know-how, and stimulation of do-
mestic ﬁnancial-sector development could all provide direct growth bene-
ﬁts, which in turn should help reduce poverty.
Second, an increase in macroeconomic volatility tends to reduce the
well-being of poor households. Recent empirical research ﬁnds that vola-
tility has a signiﬁcantly negative and causal impact on poverty (Laur-
sen and Mahajan 2005). Why does macroeconomic volatility appear to be
especially harmful for the poor? First, the poor have the least access to ﬁ-
nancial markets, making it diﬃcult for them to diversify the risk associated
with their income, which is often based on a narrow set of sources, includ-
ing mainly labor earnings and government transfers. Second, since the
poor rely heavily on various public services, including education and
health, they are directly aﬀected by changes in government spending.
Given that ﬁscal policy is procyclical in most developing countries, this
magniﬁes the negative impact of volatility on poverty, especially during ﬁ-
nancial crises. Moreover, the poor often lack necessary education and skill
levels, which limits their ability to move across sectors in order to adjust to
changes in economic conditions. As we discuss later in the chapter, in the-
ory, increased trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows could help reduce macroeconomic
volatility, which also could have beneﬁcial eﬀects for the poor (Aizenman
and Pinto 2005).
The principal conclusions that emerge from our analysis of the macro-
economic eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization are sobering but in many ways
informative from a policy perspective. It is true that many developing econ-
omies with a high degree of ﬁnancial integration have experienced higher
growth rates. It is also true that, in theory, there are many channels by
which ﬁnancial openness could enhance growth. However, a systematic ex-
amination of the evidence suggests that it is diﬃcult to establish a robust
causal relationship between the degree of ﬁnancial integration and output
growth performance. Furthermore, from the perspective of macroeco-
nomic stability, consumption is regarded as a better measure of well-being
than output; ﬂuctuations in consumption are therefore regarded as having
a negative impact on economic welfare. There is little evidence that ﬁnan-
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tions in consumption growth, notwithstanding the theoretically large ben-
eﬁts that could accrue to developing countries in this respect. In fact, new
evidence presented in this paper suggests that low to moderate levels of ﬁ-
nancial integration may have made some countries subject to even greater
volatility of consumption relative to that of output. Thus, while there is no
proof in the data that ﬁnancial globalization has beneﬁted growth, there is
evidence that some developing countries may have experienced greater
consumption volatility as a result.
One must be careful, however, not to draw the inference from these re-
sults that ﬁnancial globalization is inherently too risky and that developing
countries should retreat into stronger forms of capital controls. First, as we
discuss in an earlier, extended version of this paper (Prasad et al. 2003),
empirical evidence supports the view that countries are considerably more
likely to beneﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization when they take simultaneous
steps—sometimes even modest ones—to improve governance, transpar-
ency, and ﬁnancial-sector regulation. Second, it is almost surely the case
that excessive reliance on ﬁxed exchange rate regimes has been a major
contributory factor to ﬁnancial crises in emerging-market countries over
the past ﬁfteen years. Moving to more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes is
therefore likely to considerably alleviate some of the risks countries must
endure as they become more ﬁnancially globalized (for countries that are
not ﬁnancially globalized, ﬁxed exchange rate regimes may be a perfectly
good choice, as the empirical results in Rogoﬀ et al. 2004 suggest). Third,
countries that consistently face problems associated with government debt
(referred to as “serial defaulters” by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 2004), are more
likely to beneﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization if their governments simulta-
neously take measures to avoid an excessive buildup of debt.
It is also important to note that much of the analysis in this paper focuses
on de facto rather than de jure ﬁnancial globalization. This makes sense in
an empirical paper since capital controls come in so many ﬂavors, and en-
forcement varies so widely across countries, that cross-country empirical
comparisons based on measures of de jure capital controls are extremely
diﬃcult to interpret. By contrast, de facto ﬁnancial integration is not a
variable that a country’s government can easily regulate. Although many
countries have tight capital controls on paper, their degree of de facto ﬁ-
nancial globalization is nevertheless high because these controls can be
easily evaded in practice. This problem is almost surely exacerbated by the
kind of domestic ﬁnancial liberalizations that many countries have chosen
to undergo over the past two decades in an eﬀort to channel savings more
eﬃciently and thereby spur growth. At the same time, some poor countries
have few impediments to capital ﬂows, but their level of de facto ﬁnancial
globalization is still very low, even when measured relative to national in-
come.
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alization aﬀects absolute or relative measures of poverty. Based on the re-
sults from our analysis, the eﬀects could easily go in opposite directions.1
On the one hand, sustained high growth is the most consistently successful
policy for alleviating absolute poverty, as China and India have succeeded
in doing over the past two decades. On the other hand, periods of high
growth are often associated with higher income inequality, and, therefore,
relative measures of poverty may easily rise. Increased macroeconomic
volatility, however, probably increases both absolute and relative measures
of poverty, particularly in the case of ﬁnancial crises that lead to sharp rises
in unemployment. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that a de-
tailed study of the link between ﬁnancial globalization and poverty is likely
to yield ambiguous results for emerging-market countries, albeit with the
same caveats: countries that work simultaneously to improve institutions,
and ones that avoid overly ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, have a much better
chance of seeing ﬁnancial globalization lead to poverty reduction, at least
by absolute measures.
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the structure of
the paper. In brief, section 11.2 begins with documentation of some salient
features of global ﬁnancial integration from the perspective of developing
countries. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 analyze the evidence on the eﬀects of ﬁ-
nancial globalization on growth and volatility, respectively, in developing
countries. Section 11.5 concludes.
11.1.1 Deﬁnitions and Basic Stylized Facts
Financial globalization and ﬁnancial integration are, in principle, diﬀer-
ent concepts. Financial globalization is an aggregate concept that refers to
rising global linkages through cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows. Financial inte-
gration refers to an individual country’s linkages to international capital
markets. Clearly, these concepts are closely related. For instance, increas-
ing ﬁnancial globalization is perforce associated with rising ﬁnancial inte-
gration on average. In this paper, the two terms are used interchangeably.
Of more relevance for the purposes of this paper is the distinction be-
tween de jure ﬁnancial integration, which is associated with policies on
capital account liberalization, and actual capital ﬂows. For example, indi-
cator measures of the extent of government restrictions on capital ﬂows
across national borders have been used extensively in the literature. By this
460 Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoﬀ, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose
1. Since it is diﬃcult to measure poverty and to isolate the impact of globalization on
poverty from various other factors, recent studies do not reach an unambiguous conclusion
on this issue. While Easterly (chap. 3 in this volume) documents that neither ﬁnancial nor
trade ﬂows have any signiﬁcant impact on poverty, Harrison (introduction to this volume)
notes that “there is certainly no evidence in the aggregate data that trade reforms are bad for
the poor.” Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) also argue that the empirical evidence of-
ten suggests that trade liberalization helps reduce poverty in the long run and note that “it
lends no support to the position that trade liberalization generally has an adverse impact.”measure, many countries in Latin America would be considered closed to
ﬁnancial ﬂows. On the other hand, the volume of capital actually crossing
the borders of these countries has been large relative to the average volume
of ﬂows across all developing countries. Therefore, on a de facto basis,
these countries are quite open to global ﬁnancial ﬂows. By contrast, some
countries in Africa have few formal restrictions on capital account trans-
actions but have not experienced signiﬁcant capital ﬂows. The analysis in
this paper will focus largely on de facto measures of ﬁnancial integration,
as it is virtually impossible to compare the eﬃcacy of various complex re-
strictions across countries. In the end, what matters most is the actual de-
gree of openness. However, the paper will also consider the relationship be-
tween de jure and de facto measures.
As will be discussed in section 11.2, a few salient features of global cap-
ital ﬂows are relevant for the central themes of the paper. First, the volume
of cross-border capital ﬂows has risen substantially in the last decade. Not
only has there been a much greater volume of ﬂows among industrial coun-
tries, but there has also been a surge in ﬂows between industrial and devel-
oping countries. Second, this surge in international capital ﬂows to devel-
oping countries is the outcome of both “pull” and “push” factors. Pull
factors arise from changes in policies and other aspects of opening up by
developing countries. These include liberalization of capital accounts and
domestic stock markets, and large-scale privatization programs. Push fac-
tors include business cycle conditions and macroeconomic policy changes
in industrial countries. From a longer-term perspective, this latter set of
factors includes the rise in the importance of institutional investors in in-
dustrial countries and demographic changes (e.g., relative aging of the
population in industrial countries). The importance of these factors sug-
gests that, notwithstanding temporary interruptions in crisis periods or
during global business cycle downturns, the past twenty years have been
characterized by secular pressures for rising global capital ﬂows to the de-
veloping world.
Another important feature of international capital ﬂows is that the com-
ponents of these ﬂows diﬀer markedly in terms of volatility. In particular,
bank borrowing and portfolio ﬂows are substantially more volatile than
foreign direct investment. In spite of a caveat that accurate classiﬁcation of
capital ﬂows is not easy, evidence suggests that the composition of capital
ﬂows can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on a country’s vulnerability to ﬁnan-
cial crises.
11.1.2 Does Financial Globalization Promote Growth
in Developing Countries?
Section 11.3 will summarize the theoretical beneﬁts of ﬁnancial global-
ization for economic growth and then review the empirical evidence. Fi-
nancial globalization could, in principle, help to raise the growth rate in de-
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aﬀect the determinants of economic growth (augmentation of domestic
savings, reduction in the cost of capital, transfer of technology from ad-
vanced to developing countries, and development of domestic ﬁnancial
sectors). Indirect channels, which in some cases could be even more im-
portant than the direct ones, include increased production specialization
due to better risk management, and improvements in both macroeconomic
policies and institutions induced by the competitive pressures or the “dis-
cipline eﬀect” of globalization.
How many of the advertised beneﬁts for economic growth have actually
materialized in the developing world? As documented in this paper, the av-
erage income per capita for the group of more ﬁnancially open (develop-
ing) economies does grow at a more favorable rate than that of the group
of less ﬁnancially open economies. However, whether this actually reﬂects
a causal relationship and whether this correlation is robust to controlling
for other factors remain unresolved questions. The literature on this sub-
ject, voluminous as it is, does not present a conclusive picture. A few pa-
pers ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on growth. However, the
majority ﬁnd no eﬀect or at best a mixed eﬀect. Thus, an objective reading
of the vast research eﬀort to date suggests that there is no strong, robust,
and uniform support for the theoretical argument that ﬁnancial globaliza-
tion per se delivers a higher rate of economic growth.
Perhaps this is not surprising. As noted by several authors, most of the
cross-country diﬀerences in per capita incomes stem not from diﬀerences in
the capital-labor ratio but from diﬀerences in total factor productivity, which
could be explained by “soft” factors like governance and rule of law. In this
case, although embracing ﬁnancial globalization may result in higher capi-
tal inﬂows, it is unlikely to cause faster growth by itself. In addition, some of
the countries with capital account liberalization have experienced output
collapses related to costly banking or currency crises. This is elaborated be-
low. An alternative possibility, as noted earlier, is that ﬁnancial globalization
fosters better institutions and domestic policies but that these indirect chan-
nels cannot be captured in standard regression frameworks.
In short, while ﬁnancial globalization can, in theory, help to promote
economic growth through various channels, there is as yet no robust em-
pirical evidence that this causal relationship is quantitatively very impor-
tant. This points to an interesting contrast between ﬁnancial openness and
trade openness, since an overwhelming majority of research papers have
found a positive eﬀect of the latter on economic growth.
11.1.3 What Is the Impact of Financial Globalization
on Macroeconomic Volatility?
In theory, ﬁnancial globalization can help developing countries to better
manage output and consumption volatility. Indeed, a variety of theories
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go down as the degree of ﬁnancial integration increases; the essence of
global ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation is that a country is able to oﬄoad some of
its income risk in world markets. Since most developing countries are
rather specialized in their output and factor endowment structures, they
can, in theory, obtain even bigger gains than developed countries through
international consumption risk sharing—that is, by eﬀectively selling oﬀ a
stake in their domestic output in return for a stake in global output.
How much of the potential beneﬁt in terms of better management of
consumption volatility has actually been realized? This question is partic-
ularly relevant in terms of understanding whether, despite the output
volatility experienced by developing countries that have undergone ﬁnan-
cial crises, ﬁnancial integration has protected them from consumption
volatility. New research presented in section 11.4 paints a troubling pic-
ture. Speciﬁcally, while the volatility of output growth declined, on aver-
age, in the 1990s relative to the three earlier decades, the volatility of con-
sumption growth relative to that of income growth increasedon average for
the emerging-market economies in the 1990s, which was precisely the pe-
riod of a rapid increase in ﬁnancial globalization. In other words, as argued
in more detail later in the paper, procyclical access to international capital
markets appears to have had a perverse eﬀect on the relative volatility of
consumption for ﬁnancially integrated developing economies.
Interestingly, a more nuanced look at the data suggests the possible pres-
ence of a threshold eﬀect. At low levels of ﬁnancial integration, an incre-
ment in ﬁnancial integration is associated with an increase in the relative
volatility of consumption. However, once the level of ﬁnancial integration
crosses a threshold, the association becomes negative. In other words, for
countries that are suﬃciently open ﬁnancially, relative consumption vola-
tility starts to decline. This ﬁnding is potentially consistent with the view
that international ﬁnancial integration can help to promote domestic
ﬁnancial-sector development, which in turn can help to moderate domes-
tic macroeconomic volatility. However, thus far these beneﬁts of ﬁnancial
integration appear to have accrued primarily to industrial countries.
In this vein, the proliferation of ﬁnancial and currency crises among de-
veloping economies is often viewed as a natural consequence of the grow-
ing pains associated with ﬁnancial globalization. These can take various
forms. First, international investors have a tendency to engage in momen-
tum trading and herding, which can be destabilizing for developing econ-
omies. Second, international investors (together with domestic residents)
may engage in speculative attacks on developing countries currencies,
thereby causing instability that is not warranted based on the economic
and policy fundamentals of these countries. Third, the risk of contagion
presents a major threat to otherwise healthy countries since international
investors could withdraw capital from these countries for reasons unre-
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elected, may not give suﬃcient weight to the interests of future generations.
This becomes a problem when the interests of future and current genera-
tions diverge, causing the government to incur excessive amounts of debt.
Financial globalization, by making it easier for governments to incur debt,
might aggravate this overborrowing problem. These four hypotheses are
not necessarily independent, and can reinforce each other.
There is some empirical support for these hypothesized eﬀects. For ex-
ample, there is evidence that international investors do engage in herding
and momentum trading in emerging markets, more so than in developed
countries. Recent research also suggests the presence of contagion in in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets. In addition, some developing countries that
open their capital markets do appear to accumulate unsustainably high
levels of external debt.
To summarize, one of the theoretical beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalization,
other than to enhance growth, is to allow developing countries to better
manage macroeconomic volatility, especially by reducing consumption
volatility relative to output volatility. The evidence suggests that, instead,
countries that are in the early stages of ﬁnancial integration have been ex-
posed to signiﬁcant risks in terms of higher volatility of both output and
consumption.
11.1.4 The Role of Institutions and Governance 
in the Eﬀects of Globalization
While it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a simple relationship between ﬁnancial glob-
alization and growth or consumption volatility, there is some evidence of
nonlinearities or threshold eﬀects in the relationship. That is, ﬁnancial
globalization, in combination with good macroeconomic policies and
good domestic governance, appears to be conducive to growth (see Prasad
et al. 2003). For example, countries with good human capital and gover-
nance tend to do better at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), which
is especially conducive to growth. More speciﬁcally, recent research shows
that corruption has a strongly negative eﬀect on FDI inﬂows. Similarly,
transparency of government operations, which is another dimension of
good governance, has a strong positive eﬀect on investment inﬂows from
international mutual funds.
The vulnerability of a developing country to the risk factors associated
with ﬁnancial globalization is also not independent from the quality of
macroeconomic policies and domestic governance. For example, research
has demonstrated that an overvalued exchange rate and an overextended
domestic lending boom often precede a currency crisis. In addition, lack of
transparency has been shown to be associated with more herding behavior
by international investors that can destabilize a developing country’s ﬁ-
nancial markets. Finally, evidence shows that a high degree of corruption
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makes it more vulnerable to the risks of speculative attacks and contagion
eﬀects.
Thus, the ability of a developing country to derive beneﬁts from ﬁnan-
cial globalization and its relative vulnerability to the volatility of interna-
tional capital ﬂows can be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the quality of both its
macroeconomic framework and its institutions.
11.1.5 Summary
The objective of the paper is not so much to derive new policy proposi-
tions as it is to inform the debate on the potential and actual beneﬁt-risk
trade-oﬀs associated with ﬁnancial globalization by reviewing the avail-
able empirical evidence and country experiences. The main conclusions
are that, so far, it has proven diﬃcult to ﬁnd robust evidence in support of
the proposition that ﬁnancial integration helps developing countries to im-
prove growth and to reduce macroeconomic volatility.
Of course, the absence of robust evidence on these dimensions does not
necessarily mean that ﬁnancial globalization has no beneﬁts and carries
only great risks. Indeed, most countries that have initiated ﬁnancial inte-
gration have continued along this path, despite temporary setbacks. This
observation is consistent with the notion that the indirect beneﬁts of ﬁ-
nancial integration, which may be diﬃcult to pick up in regression analysis,
could be quite important. Also, the long-run gains, in some cases yet unre-
alized, may far oﬀset the short-term costs. For instance, the European
Monetary Union experienced severe and costly crises in the early 1990s
as part of the transition to a single currency throughout much of Europe
today.
Although it is diﬃcult to distill new and innovative policy messages from
the review of the evidence, there appears to be empirical support for some
general propositions. Empirically, good institutions and quality of gover-
nance are important not only in their own right but also in helping devel-
oping countries derive the beneﬁts of globalization. Similarly, macroeco-
nomic stability appears to be an important prerequisite for ensuring that
ﬁnancial integration is beneﬁcial for developing countries. These points
may already be generally accepted; the contribution of this paper is to
show that there is some systematic empirical evidence to support them. In
addition, the analysis suggests that ﬁnancial globalization should be ap-
proached cautiously and with good institutions and macroeconomic
frameworks viewed as preconditions.
11.2 Basic Stylized Facts
De jure restrictions on capital ﬂows and actual capital ﬂows across na-
tional borders are two ways of measuring the extent of a country’s ﬁnan-
Financial Globalization, Growth, Volatility in Developing Countries 465cial integration with the global economy. The diﬀerences between these
two measures are important for understanding the eﬀects of ﬁnancial inte-
gration. By either measure, developing countries’ ﬁnancial linkages with
the global economy have risen in recent years.2 However, a relatively small
group of developing countries has garnered the lion’s share of private cap-
ital ﬂows from industrial to developing countries, which surged in the
1990s. Structural factors, including demographic shifts in industrial coun-
tries, are likely to provide an impetus to these North-South ﬂows over the
medium and long term.
11.2.1 Measuring Financial Integration
Capital account liberalization is typically considered an important pre-
cursor to ﬁnancial integration. Most formal empirical work analyzing the
eﬀects of capital account liberalization has used a measure based on the
oﬃcial restrictions on capital ﬂows as reported to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) by national authorities. However, this binary indicator
directly measures capital controls but does not capture diﬀerences in the
intensity of thesecontrols.3 A more direct measure of ﬁnancial openness is
based on the estimated gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities as a
share of gross domestic product (GDP). The stock data constitute a better
indication of integration, for our purposes, than the underlying ﬂows since
they are less volatile from year to year and are less prone to measurement
error (assuming that such errors are not correlated over time).4
Although these two measures of ﬁnancial integration are related, they
denote two distinct aspects. The capital account restrictions measure re-
ﬂects the existence of de jure restrictions on capital ﬂows, while the ﬁnan-
cial openness measure captures de facto ﬁnancial integration in terms of
realized capital ﬂows. This distinction is of considerable importance for the
analysis in this paper and implies a 2   2 set of combinations of these two
aspects of integration. Many industrial countries have attained a high de-
gree of ﬁnancial integration in terms of both measures. Some developing
countries with capital account restrictions have found these restrictions in-
eﬀective in controlling actual capital ﬂows. Episodes of capital ﬂight from
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2. Bordo and Eichengreen (2002), Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), and Mauro, Sussman, and
Yafeh (2002) examine historical roots of international ﬁnancial integration.
3. The restriction measure is available until 1995, when a new and more reﬁned measure—
not backward compatible—was introduced. The earlier data were extended through 1998 by
Mody and Murshid (2002).
4. These stock data were constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). Operationally,
this measure involves calculating the gross levels of FDI and portfolio assets and liabilities via
the accumulation of the corresponding inﬂows and outﬂows, and making relevant valuation
adjustments. A similar measure using the same underlying stock data has been considered by
Chanda (2006) and O’Donnell (2001). Other measures of capital market integration include
saving-investment correlations and various interest parity conditions (Frankel 1992). These
measures are diﬃcult to operationalize for the extended time period and large number of
countries in the data sample for this paper.some Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s are examples of
such involuntary de facto ﬁnancial integration in economies that are de
jure closed to ﬁnancial ﬂows (i.e., integration without capital account lib-
eralization). On the other hand, some countries in Africa have few capital
account restrictions but have experienced only minimal levels of capital
ﬂows (i.e., liberalization without integration).5 And, of course, it is not
diﬃcult to ﬁnd examples of countries with closed capital accounts that are
also eﬀectively closed in terms of capital ﬂows.
How has ﬁnancial integration evolved over time for diﬀerent groups of
countries based on alternativemeasures?6By either measure, the diﬀerence
in ﬁnancial openness between industrial and developing countries is quite
stark. Industrial economies have had an enormous increase in ﬁnancial
openness, particularly in the 1990s. While this measure also increased for
developing economies in that decade, the level remains far below that of in-
dustrial economies.
For industrial countries, unweighted cross-country averages of the two
measures are mirror images and jointly conﬁrm that these countries have
undergone rapid ﬁnancial integration since the mid-1980s (ﬁg. 11.1).7 For
developing countries, the average restriction measure indicates that, after a
period of liberalization in the 1970s, the trend toward openness reversed in
the 1980s. Liberalization resumed in the early 1990s but at a slow pace. On
the other hand, the average ﬁnancial openness measure for these countries,
based on actual ﬂows, shows a modest increase in the 1980s, followed by a
sharp rise in the 1990s. The increase in the ﬁnancial openness measure for de-
veloping economies reﬂects a more rapid de facto integration than is cap-
tured by the relatively crude measure of capital account restrictions.
However, the eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration in terms of increased capi-
tal ﬂows have been spread very unevenly across developing countries.8 To
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5. An analogy from the literature on international trade may be relevant here. Some coun-
tries, due to their remoteness from major world markets or other unfavorable geographical at-
tributes, have low trade ﬂows despite having minimal barriers to trade even after controlling
for various other factors. Similarly, certain countries, due to their remoteness from major ﬁ-
nancial centers in either physical distance or historical relationships, may experience limited
capital ﬂows despite having relatively open capital accounts (see Loungani, Mody, and Razin
2003).
6. The data set used in this paper consists of seventy-six industrial and developing countries
(except where otherwise indicated) and covers the period 1960–99. Given the long sample pe-
riod, several countries currently deﬁned as industrial (e.g., Korea and Singapore) are included
in the developing-country group. The following were excluded from the data set: most of the
highly indebted poor countries (which mostly receive oﬃcial ﬂows), the transition economies
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (due to lack of data), very small economies
(population less than 1.5 million), and oil-exporting countries in the Middle East. See ap-
pendix for a list of countries and further details on the data set.
7. A particularly rapid decline in controls occurred during the 1980s, when the members of
the European Community, now the European Union, liberalized capital controls. A surge in
cross-border capital ﬂows followed.
8. Ishii et al. (2002) examine in detail the experiences of a number of developing countries.examine the extent of these disparities, it is useful to begin with a very
coarse classiﬁcation of the developing countries in the sample into two
groups based on a ranking according to the average of the ﬁnancial open-
ness measure over the last four decades (as well as an assessment of other
indicators of ﬁnancial integration).
The ﬁrst group, which comprises twenty-two countries, is henceforth la-
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A
Fig. 11.1 Measures of ﬁnancial integration: A, industrial countries; 
B, developing countries
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001)
Bbeled as the set of more ﬁnancially integrated (MFI) countries, and the sec-
ond group, which includes thirty-three countries, as the less ﬁnancially in-
tegrated (LFI) countries.9 This distinction must be interpreted with some
care at this stage. In particular, it is worth repeating that the criterion is a
measure of de facto integration based on actual capital ﬂows rather than a
measure of the strength of policies designed to promote ﬁnancial integra-
tion. Indeed, a few of the countries in the MFI group do have relatively
closed capital accounts in a de jure sense. In general, as argued below, pol-
icy choices do determine the degree and nature of ﬁnancial integration.
Nevertheless, for the analysis in this paper, the degree of ﬁnancial openness
based on actual capital ﬂows is a more relevant measure.
It should be noted that the main conclusions of this paper are not cru-
cially dependent on the particulars of the classiﬁcation of developing
countries into the MFI and LFI groups. This classiﬁcation is obviously a
static one and does not account for diﬀerences across countries in the tim-
ing and degree of ﬁnancial integration. It is used for some of the descrip-
tive analysis presented below, but only in order to illustrate the conclusions
from the more detailed econometric studies that are surveyed in the paper.
The areas where this classiﬁcation yields results diﬀerent from those ob-
tained from more formal econometric analysis will be clearly highlighted
in the paper. The regression results reported in this paper are based on the
gross capital ﬂows measure described earlier, which does capture diﬀer-
ences across countries and changes over time in the degree of ﬁnancial in-
tegration.
Figure 11.2 shows that the vast majority of international private gross
capital ﬂows of developing countries, especially in the 1990s, are ac-
counted for by the relatively small group of MFI economies.10By contrast,
private capital ﬂows to and from the LFI economies have remained very
small over the last decade and, for certain types of ﬂows, have even fallen
relative to the late 1970s.
11.2.2 North-South Capital Flows
One of the key features of global ﬁnancial integration over the last
decade has been the dramatic increase in net private capital ﬂows from in-
dustrial countries (the North) to developing countries (the South). Figure
11.3 breaks down the levels of these ﬂows into the four main constituent
categories. The main increase has been in terms of FDI and portfolio ﬂows,
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9. Not surprisingly, this classiﬁcation results in a set of MFI economies that roughly corre-
sponds to those included in the Morgan Stanley Country Index (MSCI) emerging-markets
stock index. The main diﬀerences are that we drop the transition economies because of lim-
ited data availability and add Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and Singa-
pore.
10. Note that the scale of the graph in panel A is twice as big as that of the graph in 
panel B.while the relative importance of bank lending has declined somewhat. In
fact, net bank lending turned negative for a few years during the time of the
Asian crisis.
The bulk of the surge in net FDI ﬂows from the advanced economies has
gone to MFI economies, with only a small fraction going to LFI economies
(ﬁgure 11.3, panels B and C). Net portfolio ﬂows show a similar pattern, al-
though both types of ﬂows to MFI economies fell sharply following the
A
B
Fig. 11.2 Gross capital ﬂows (percent of GDP): A, MFI economies; 
B, LFI economies
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, International Financial Statistics
Note: The reader should note that the left scales on the two panels are diﬀerent.
470 Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoﬀ, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan KoseFig. 11.3 Net private capital ﬂows (billions of U.S. dollars): A, all developing
economies; B, MFI economies; C, LFI economies
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
Note: Bank lending to the MFI economies was negative between 1997 and 1999.
Asian crisis and have remained relatively ﬂat since then. LFI economies
have been much more dependent on bank lending (and, although not
shown here, on oﬃcial ﬂows including loans and grants). There were surges
in bank lending to this group of countries in the late 1970s and early 1990s.
Another important feature of these ﬂows is that they diﬀer substantially
in volatility. Table 11.1 shows the volatility of FDI, portfolio ﬂows, and
bank lending to developing economies. Of the diﬀerent categories of
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A
C Bprivate capital ﬂows to developing economies, FDI ﬂows are the least
volatile, which is not surprising given their long-term and relatively ﬁxed
nature. Portfolio ﬂows tend to be far more volatile and prone to abrupt re-
versals than FDI. These patterns hold when the MFI and LFI economies
are examined separately. Even in the case of LFIs, the volatility of FDI
ﬂows is much lower than that of other types of ﬂows.11 This diﬀerence in
the relative volatility of diﬀerent categories has important implications
that will be examined in more detail later.
11.2.3 Factors Underlying the Rise in North-South Capital Flows
The surge in net private capital ﬂows to MFIs, as well as the shifts in the
composition of these ﬂows, can be broken down into pull and push factors
(Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993). These are related to, respectively,
(a) policies and other developments in the MFIs and (b) changes in global
ﬁnancial markets. The ﬁrst category includes factors such as stock market
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Table 11.1 Volatility of diﬀerent types of capital inﬂows
FDI/GDP Loan/GDP Portfolio/GDP
Standard deviations 
(median for each group)
MFI economies 0.007 0.032 0.009
LFI economies 0.010 0.036 0.002
Coeﬃcients of variation 
(median for each group)
MFI economies 0.696 1.245 1.751
LFI economies 1.276 1.177 2.494
Coeﬃcients of variation for 
selected MFI economies
Indonesia 0.820 0.717 1.722
Korea 0.591 2.039 1.338
Malaysia 0.490 4.397 3.544
Mexico 0.452 2.048 2.088
The Philippines 0.921 0.956 1.979
Thailand 0.571 0.629 1.137
Source: Wei (2001).
Notes:Computed over the period 1980–96. Only countries with at least eight nonmissing obser-
vations during the period for all three variables and with a population greater than or equal to
one million in 1995 are kept in the sample. Total inward FDI ﬂows, total bank loans, and total
inward portfolio investments are from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics, various issues.
11. Consistent with these results, Taylor and Sarno (1999) ﬁnd that FDI ﬂows are more per-
sistent than other types of ﬂows. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) ﬁnd weaker conﬁr-
mation of this result and also note that, although the volatility of FDI ﬂows has been rising
over time, it remains lower than that of other types of ﬂows. In interpreting these results, there
is a valid concern about potential misclassiﬁcation of the diﬀerent types of capital ﬂows. Since
most of the studies cited here use similar data sources, this is not a problem that can be easily
resolved by examining the conclusions of multiple studies.liberalizations and privatization of state-owned companies that have stim-
ulated foreign inﬂows. The second category includes the growing impor-
tance of depositary receipts and cross-listings and the emergence of insti-
tutional investors as key players driving international capital ﬂows to
emerging markets.
The investment opportunities aﬀorded by stock market liberalizations,
which have typically included the provision of access to foreign investors,
have enhanced capital ﬂows to MFIs. How much have restrictions on for-
eign investors’ access to local stock markets in MFIs changed over time?
To answer this question, it is useful to examine a new measure of stock mar-
ket liberalization that captures restrictions on foreign ownership of do-
mestic equities. This measure, constructed by Edison and Warnock (2001),
is obviously just one component of capital controls, but it is an appropri-
ate one for modeling equity ﬂows. Figure 11.4 shows that stock market lib-
eralizations in MFI economies in diﬀerent regions have proceeded rapidly,
in terms of both intensity and speed.12
Mergers and acquisitions, especially those resulting from the privatiza-
tion of state-owned companies, were an important factor underlying the
increase in FDI ﬂows to MFIs during the 1990s. The easing of restrictions
on foreign participation in the ﬁnancial sector in MFIs has also provided a
strong impetus to this factor.13
Institutional investors in the industrial countries—including mutual
funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and insurance companies—have as-
sumed an important role in channeling capital ﬂows from industrial to de-
veloping economies. They have helped individual investors overcome the
information and transaction cost barriers that previously limited portfolio
allocations to emerging markets. Mutual funds, in particular, have served
as an important instrument for individuals to diversify their portfolios into
Financial Globalization, Growth, Volatility in Developing Countries 473
12. The stock market liberalization index is based on two indexes constructed by the Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC) for each country—the Global Index (IFCG) and the In-
vestable Index (IFCI). The IFCG represents the full market, while the IFCI represents the
portion of the market available to foreign investors, where availability is determined by the
IFC based on legal and liquidity criteria. Edison and Warnock (2001) propose using the ratio
of the market capitalization of the IFCG to that of the IFCI as a measure of stock market lib-
eralization. This ratio provides a quantitative measure of the degree of access that foreign in-
vestors have to a particular country’s equity markets; one minus this ratio can be interpreted
as a measure of the intensity of capital controls in this dimension.
13. The World Bank’s (2001) Global Development Finance report notes that FDI in Latin
America’s ﬁnancial sector has come about through the purchases of privately owned domes-
tic banks, driving up the share of banking assets under foreign control from 8 percent in 1994
to 25 percent in 1999. In East Asia, foreign investors have purchased local banks in ﬁnancial
distress, leading to an increase in the share of banking assets under foreign control from 2 per-
cent in 1994 to 6 percent in 1999.
14. The presence of mutual funds in MFIs grew substantially during the 1990s. For example,
dedicated emerging-market equity funds held $21 billion in Latin American stocks by end 1995.
By end 1997, their holdings had increased to $40 billion. While mutual funds’ growth in Asia has
been less pronounced, the presence of mutual funds is still important in many countries in that
region. See Eichengreen, Mathieson, and Chadha (1998) for a detailed study on hedge funds.developing-country holdings.14 Although international institutional in-
vestors devote only a small fraction of their portfolios to holdings in MFIs,
they have an important presence in these economies, given the relatively
small size of their capital markets. Funds dedicated to emerging markets
alone hold on average 5–15 percent of the Asian, Latin American, and
transition economies’ market capitalization.
Notwithstanding the moderation of North-South capital ﬂows follow-
ing recent emerging-market crises, certain structural forces are likely to
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A B
C D
Fig. 11.4 Foreign ownership restrictions (MFI developing economies): A, total; 
B, Asia; C, Western Hemisphere; D, Africa
Source: Edison and Warnock (2001).
Note: This index measures the intensity of restrictions on the access that foreign investors
have to a particular country’s equity markets.lead to a revival of these ﬂows over the medium and long term. Demo-
graphic shifts, in particular, constitute an important driving force for these
ﬂows. Projected increases in old-age dependency ratios reﬂect the major
changes in demographic proﬁles that are underway in industrial countries.
This trend is likely to intensify further in the coming decades, fueled by
both advances in medical technology that have increased average life spans
and the decline in fertility rates. Financing the postretirement consump-
tion needs of a rapidly aging population will require increases in current
saving rates, both national and private, in these economies. However, if
such increases in saving rates do materialize, they are likely to result in a
declining rate of return on capital in advanced economies, especially rela-
tive to that in the capital-poor countries of the South. This will lead to nat-
ural tendencies for capital to ﬂow to countries where it has a potentially
higher return.
All of these forces imply that, despite the recent sharp reversals in
North-South capital ﬂows, developing countries will eventually once again
face the delicate balance of opportunities and risks aﬀorded by ﬁnancial
globalization. Are the beneﬁts derived from ﬁnancial integration suﬃcient
to oﬀset the costs of increased exposure to the vagaries of international
capital ﬂows? The paper now turns to an examination of the evidence on
this question.
11.3 Financial Integration and Economic Growth
Theoretical models have identiﬁed a number of channels through which
international ﬁnancial integration can help to promote economic growth
in the developing world. However, it has proven diﬃcult to empirically
identify a strong and robust causal relationship between ﬁnancial integra-
tion and growth.
11.3.1 Potential Beneﬁts of Financial Globalization in Theory
In theory, there are a number of direct and indirect channels through
which embracing ﬁnancial globalization can help enhance growth in de-
veloping countries. Figure 11.5 provides a schematic summary of these
possible channels. These channels are interrelated in some ways, but this
delineation is useful for reviewing the empirical evidence on the quantita-
tive importance of each channel.15
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15. Some of these channels also come into play in transmitting the beneﬁcial eﬀects of glob-
alization to the poor. For example, augmentation of domestic savings, reduction in the cost
of capital, transfer of technological know-how, and stimulation of domestic ﬁnancial-sector
development could all provide direct growth beneﬁts, which in turn help reduce poverty.
Agénor (2003), Easterly (chap. 3 in this volume), and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) discuss
various theoretical channels through which globalization aﬀects poverty.Direct Channels
Augmentation of domestic savings. North-South capital ﬂows in principle
beneﬁt both groups. They allow for increased investment in capital-poor
countries while they provide a higher return on capital than is available in
capital-rich countries. This eﬀectively reduces the risk-free rate in the de-
veloping countries.
Reduction in the cost of capital through better global allocation of risk. In-
ternational asset pricing models predict that stock market liberalization
improves the allocation of risk (Henry 2000; Stulz 1999a, 1999b). First, in-
creased risk-sharing opportunities between foreign and domestic investors
might help to diversify risks. This ability to diversify in turn encourages
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Fig. 11.5 Channels through which ﬁnancial integration can raise economic growthﬁrms to take on more total investment, thereby enhancing growth. Third,
as capital ﬂows increase, the domestic stock market becomes more liquid,
which could further reduce the equity risk premium, thereby lowering the
cost of raising capital for investment.
Transfer of technological and managerial know-how. Financially integrated
economies seem to attract a disproportionately large share of FDI inﬂows,
which have the potential to generate technology spillovers and to serve as
a conduit for passing on better management practices. These spillovers can
raise aggregate productivity and, in turn, boost economic growth (Bor-
ensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 1998; Grossman and Helpman 1991a,
1991b).
Stimulation of domestic ﬁnancial-sector development. It has already been
noted that international portfolio ﬂows can increase the liquidity of do-
mestic stock markets. Increased foreign ownership of domestic banks can
also generate a variety of other beneﬁts (Levine 1996; Caprio and Hono-
han 1999). First, foreign bank participation can facilitate access to inter-
national ﬁnancial markets. Second, it can help improve the regulatory and
supervisory framework of the domestic banking industry. Third, foreign
banks often introduce a variety of new ﬁnancial instruments and tech-
niques and also foster technological improvements in domestic markets.
The entry of foreign banks tends to increase competition, which, in turn,
can improve the quality of domestic ﬁnancial services as well as allocative
eﬃciency.
Indirect Channels
Promotion of specialization. The notion that specialization in production
may increase productivity and growth is intuitive. However, without any
mechanism for risk management, a highly specialized production struc-
ture will produce high output volatility and, hence, high consumption
volatility. Concerns about exposure to such increases in volatility may dis-
courage countries from taking up growth-enhancing specialization activi-
ties; the higher volatility will also generally imply lower overall savings and
investment rates. In principle, ﬁnancial globalization could play a useful
role by helping countries to engage in international risk sharing and
thereby reduce consumption volatility. This point will be taken up again in
the next section. Here, it should just be noted that risk sharing would indi-
rectly encourage specialization, which in turn would raise the growth rate.
This logic is explained by Brainard and Cooper (1968), Kemp and Liviatan
(1973), Ruﬃn (1974), and Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). Among developed
countries and across regions within given developed countries, there is in-
deed some evidence that better risk sharing is associated with higher spe-
cialization (Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha 2001).
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could increase productivity in an economy through its impact on the gov-
ernment’s ability to credibly commit to a future course of policies. More
speciﬁcally, the disciplining role of ﬁnancial integration could change the dy-
namics of domestic investment in an economy to the extent that it leads to a
reallocation of capital toward more productive activities in response to
changes in macroeconomic policies. National governments are occasionally
tempted to institute predatory tax policies on physical capital. The prospect
of such policies tends to discourage investment and reduce growth. Finan-
cial opening can be self-sustaining and constrains the government from en-
gaging in such predatory policies in the future since the negative conse-
quences of such actions are far more severe under ﬁnancial integration.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) illustrate this point in a theoretical model.
Signaling. A country’s willingness to undertake ﬁnancial integration could
be interpreted as a signal that it is going to practice more friendly policies
toward foreign investment in the future. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) sug-
gest that the removal of restrictions on capital outﬂows can, through its
signaling role, lead to an increase in capital inﬂows. Many countries, in-
cluding Colombia, Egypt, Italy, New Zealand, Mexico, Spain, Uruguay,
and the United Kingdom, have received signiﬁcant capital inﬂows after re-
moving restrictions on capital outﬂows.16
11.3.2 Empirical Evidence
On the surface, there seems to be a positive association between em-
bracing ﬁnancial globalization and the level of economic development. In-
dustrial countries in general are more ﬁnancially integrated with the global
economy than developing countries. So embracing globalization is appar-
ently part of being economically advanced.
Within the developing world, it is also the case that MFI economies grew
faster than LFI economies over the last three decades. From 1970 to 1999,
average output per capita rose almost threefold in the group of MFI de-
veloping economies, almost six times greater than the corresponding in-
crease for LFI economies. This pattern of higher growth for the former
group applies over each of the three decades and also extends to consump-
tion and investment growth.
However, there are two problems with deducing a positive eﬀect of ﬁ-
nancial integration on growth from this data pattern. First, this pattern
may be fragile upon closer scrutiny. Second, these observations only reﬂect
an association between international ﬁnancial integration and economic
performance rather than necessarily a causal relationship. In other words,
these observations do not rule out the possibility that there is reverse cau-
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16. See Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) and Labán and Larrain (1997).sation: countries that manage to enjoy robust growth may also choose to
engage in ﬁnancial integration even if ﬁnancial globalization does not di-
rectly contribute to faster growth in a quantitatively signiﬁcant way.
To provide an intuitive impression of the relationship between ﬁnancial
openness and growth, table 11.2 presents a list of the fastest-growing de-
veloping economies during 1980–2000 and a list of the slowest-growing (or
fastest-declining) economies during the same period. Some countries have
undergone ﬁnancial integration during this period, especially in the latter
half of the 1990s.17 Therefore, any result based on total changes over this
long period should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, several fea-
tures of the table are noteworthy.
An obvious observation that can be made from the table is that ﬁnancial
integration is not a necessary condition for achieving a high growth rate.
China and India have achieved high growth rates despite somewhat limited
and selective capital account liberalization. For example, while China be-
came substantially more open to FDI, it was not particularly open to most
other types of cross-border capital ﬂows. Mauritius and Botswana have
managed to achieve very strong growth rates during the period, although
they are relatively closed to ﬁnancial ﬂows.
The second observation that can be made is that ﬁnancial integration is
not a suﬃcient condition for a fast economic growth rate either. For ex-
ample, Jordan and Peru had become relatively open to foreign capital ﬂows
during the period, yet their economies suﬀered a decline rather than en-
joying positive growth during the period. On the other hand, table 11.2 also
suggests that declining economies are more likely to be ﬁnancially closed,
although the direction of causality is not clear, as explained before.
This way of looking at country cases with extreme growth performance
is only informative up to a point; it needs to be supplemented by a com-
prehensive examination of the experience of a broader set of countries us-
ing a more systematic approach to measuring ﬁnancial openness. To illus-
trate this relationship more broadly, ﬁgure 11.6 presents a scatter plot of
the growth rate of real per capita GDP against the increase in ﬁnancial in-
tegration over 1982–97. There is essentially no association between these
variables. Figure 11.7 presents a scatter plot of these two variables after
taking into account the eﬀects of a country’s initial income, initial school-
ing, average investment-GDP ratio, political instability, and regional loca-
tion. Again, the ﬁgure does not suggest a positive association between ﬁ-
nancial integration and economic growth. In fact, this ﬁnding is not unique
to the particular choice of the time period or the country coverage, as re-
ﬂected in a broad survey of other research papers on the subject.
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17. Table 11.2 reports the growth rates of real per capita GDP in constant local currency
units. The exact growth rates and country rankings may change if diﬀerent measures are used,




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.A number of empirical studies have tried to systematically examine
whether ﬁnancial integration contributes to growth using various ap-
proaches to the diﬃcult problem of proving causation. Table 11.3 summa-
rizes the fourteen most recent studies on this subject.18 Three out of the
fourteen papers report a positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on growth.
However, the majority of the papers tend to ﬁnd no eﬀect or a mixed eﬀect
for developing countries. This suggests that, if ﬁnancial integration has a
positive eﬀect on growth, it is probably not strong or robust.19
Of the papers summarized in table 11.3, the one by Edison, Levine, et al.
(2002) is perhaps the most thorough and comprehensive in measures of ﬁ-
nancial integration and in empirical speciﬁcations. These authors measure
a country’s degree of ﬁnancial integration both by the government’s re-
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Fig. 11.6 Increase in ﬁnancial openness and growth of real per capita GDP:
Simple correlation, 1982–97
Source: Wei and Wu (2006).
Note: Capital account openness is measured as (gross private capital inﬂows   gross private
capital outﬂows)/GDP.
18. This extends the survey in the October 2001 World Economic Outlook (IMF 2001) and
Edison, Klein, et al. (2002).
19. As discussed in Prasad et al. (2004), there is some evidence that diﬀerent types of capi-
tal ﬂows may have diﬀerent eﬀects on growth (see appendix I in their paper for details). Re-
cent research suggests that FDI ﬂows are positively associated with domestic investment and
output growth in a relatively consistent manner. For example, Bosworth and Collins (1999)
ﬁnd that although the impact of portfolio ﬂows on investment growth is quite minor, there is
a strong positive relationship between FDI ﬂows and investment growth. In particular, their
ﬁndings suggest that there exists an almost one-for-one relationship between FDI ﬂows and
domestic investment.Fig. 11.7 Increase in ﬁnancial openness and growth of real per capita GDP:
Conditional relationship, 1982–97
Source: Wei and Wu (2006).
Notes: Increase is conditioning on initial income, initial schooling, average investment/GDP,
political instability (revolution and coup), and regional dummies, 1982–97. Capital account
openness is measured as (gross private capital ﬂows   gross private capital outﬂows)/GDP.
Table 11.3 Summary of recent research on ﬁnancial integration and economic growth
Number of  Years  Eﬀect on 
Study countries covered growth found
Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) 20 1950–89 No eﬀect
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) 61 1966–89 No eﬀect
Quinn (1997) 58 1975–89 Positive
Kraay (1998) 117 1985–97 No eﬀect/mixed
Rodrik (1998) 95 1975–89 No eﬀect
Klein and Olivei (2000) Up to 92 1986–95 Positive
Chanda (2001) 116 1976–95 Mixed
Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001) 51–59 1973–92 Mixed
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) 30 1981–97 Positive
Edwards (2001) 62 1980s No eﬀect for poor countries
O’Donnell (2001) 94 1971–94 No eﬀect, or at best mixed
Reisen and Soto (2001) 44 1986–97 Mixed
Edison, Klein, et al. (2002) Up to 89 1973–95 Mixed
Edison, Levine, et al. (2002) 57 1980–2000 No eﬀectstrictions on capital account transactions as recorded in the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER) and by the observed size of capital ﬂows crossing the border,
normalized by the size of the economy. The data set in that paper goes
through 2000, the latest year analyzed in any existing study on this subject.
Furthermore, the authors also employ a statistical methodology that al-
lows them to deal with possible reverse causality—that is, the possibility
that any observed association between ﬁnancial integration and growth
could result from the mechanism that faster-growing economies are also
more likely to choose to liberalize their capital accounts. After a battery of
statistical analyses, that paper concludes that, overall, there is no robustly
signiﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on economic growth.
11.3.3 Synthesis
Why is it so diﬃcult to ﬁnd a strong and robust eﬀect of ﬁnancial inte-
gration on economic growth for developing countries, when the theoretical
basis for this result is apparently so strong? Perhaps there is some logic to
this outcome after all. A number of researchers have now concluded that
most of the diﬀerences in income per capita across countries stem not from
diﬀerences in capital-labor ratios but from diﬀerences in total factor pro-
ductivity, which, in turn, could be explained by soft factors or social infra-
structure like governance, rule of law, and respect for property rights.20 In
this case, although ﬁnancial integration may open the door for additional
capital to come in from abroad, it is unlikely to oﬀer a major boost to
growth by itself. In fact, if domestic governance is suﬃciently weak, ﬁnan-
cial integration could cause an exodus of domestic capital and, hence,
lower the growth rate of an economy.
This logic can be illustrated using the results reported in Senhadji (2000).
Over the period 1960 to 1994, the average growth rate of per capita output
for the group of countries in sub-Saharan Africa was the lowest among re-
gional groupings of developing countries. The diﬀerence in physical and
human capital accumulation is only part of the story of why growth rates
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20. See Hall and Jones (1999), Senhadji (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001),
Easterly and Levine (2001), and Rogoﬀ (2002) on the role of productivity diﬀerences in ex-
plaining cross-country diﬀerences in income. Gourinchas and Jeanne’s (2003) study is the
only paper that has made a direct comparison between gains from international ﬁnancial in-
tegration and those from a rise in productivity. In a calibrated model, they show that the wel-
fare gain from perfect ﬁnancial integration is roughly equivalent to a 1 percent permanent in-
crease in consumption for the typical non-OECD economy. By contrast, a productivity
increase of the order of magnitude experienced in postwar Korea yields a welfare beneﬁt that
is more than 100 times larger. The low gains from international ﬁnancial integration come
from the fact that less developed countries are on average not very far from their potential
level of capital. Non-OECD countries are less developed not primarily because they are cap-
ital scarce but because productivity is constrained by quality of institutions, economic poli-
cies, and other factors.diﬀer across countries. The gap in total factor productivity is the major el-
ement in explaining the diﬀerence in the growth rates.
Another possible explanation for why it is diﬃcult to detect a causal
eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on growth is the costly banking crises that
some developing countries have experienced in the process of ﬁnancial
integration. The results in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) suggest that a
ﬂawed sequencing of domestic ﬁnancial liberalization, when accompanied
by capital account liberalization, increases the chance of domestic bank-
ing crises and/or exchange rate crises. These crises are often accompanied
by output collapses. As a result, the beneﬁts from ﬁnancial integration may
not be evident in the data.21
It is interesting to contrast the empirical literature on the eﬀects of ﬁ-
nancial integration with that on the eﬀects of trade integration. There is a
large literature suggesting that openness to trade has a positive impact on
growth (e.g., Sachs and Warner 1995; Frankel and Romer 1999; Dollar and
Kraay 2002; and Wacziarg and Welch 2003), although some of the ﬁndings
in this literature have been challenged by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000),
who raise questions about the measures of trade openness and the econo-
metric methods employed in these studies. Nevertheless, an overwhelming
majority of empirical papers employing various techniques, including
country case studies as well as cross-country regressions, ﬁnd that trade
openness helps to promote economic growth. In a recent paper that sur-
veys all the prominent empirical research on the subject, Berg and Krueger
(2003) conclude that “varied evidence supports the view that trade open-
ness contributes greatly to growth.” Furthermore, “cross-country regres-
sions of the level of income on various determinants generally show that
openness is the most important policy variable.”22
The diﬀerential eﬀects between trade and ﬁnancial integration are
echoed in recent empirical research. As an alternative to examining the
eﬀect on economic growth or level of income, Wei and Wu (2006) examine
the eﬀects of trade and ﬁnancial openness on a society’s health status. In
particular, they analyze the following questions: Do trade and ﬁnancial
openness help to raise life expectancy and reduce infant mortality in de-
veloping countries? Are their eﬀects diﬀerent?
There are three motivations for studying these questions. First, as life ex-
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21. See Ishii et al. (2002) for country cases in this regard.
22. Baldwin (2003), Winters (2004), and Harrison and Tang (2006) also provide surveys of
the literature on trade liberalization and economic growth. Winters (2004) concludes that
“while there are serious methodological challenges and disagreements about the strength of
the evidence, the most plausible conclusion is that liberalization generally induces a tempo-
rary (but possibly long-lived) increase in growth.” Harrison and Tang (2006) argue that “while
trade integration can strengthen an eﬀective growth strategy, it cannot ensure its eﬀectiveness.
Other elements are needed, such as sound macroeconomic management, building trade-
related infrastructure, and trade-related institutions, economy-wide investments in human
capital and infrastructure, or building strong institutions.”pectancy and infant mortality are important dimensions of a society’s well-
being, they are interesting objects to look at in their own right. Second,
data on income level or growth come from national accounts, so all studies
on economic growth have to make use of variations of the similar data
sources. In comparison, vital statistics come from an entirely diﬀerent data
source (i.e., birth and death records) and are typically collected by diﬀer-
ent government agencies. Therefore, they oﬀer an independent and com-
plementary check on the eﬀect of openness on the livelihood of people.
Third, to compare income levels or growth rates across countries, it is nec-
essary to make certain purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustments to
nominal income. However, existing PPP adjustments may not be reliable
(Deaton 2001). In contrast, the deﬁnitions of life and death are consistent
across countries, so there is a higher degree of comparability than in the
data on poverty, income, or income distribution.
Wei and Wu (2006) examine data on seventy-nine developing countries
over the period 1962–97. Their data set covers all developing countries for
which the relevant data exist and for which changes in infant mortality and
life expectancy are not dominated by large-scale wars, genocides, famines,
or major outbursts of AIDS epidemics. They employ panel regressions
with country ﬁxed eﬀects as well as dynamic panel regressions to account
for other factors that may aﬀect health and to account for possible endo-
geneity of the openness variables.
Their results suggest that the eﬀects of trade and ﬁnancial openness are
diﬀerent. There is no positive and robust association across developing
countries between faster increase in ﬁnancial integration and faster im-
provement in a society’s health. By comparison, there are several pieces of
evidence suggesting that higher trade integration is associated with a faster
increase in life expectancy and a faster reduction in infant mortality. For
example, an 11 percentage point reduction in the average statutory tariﬀ
rate—approximately equal to 1 standard deviation of the change in the
statutory tariﬀ rate over the 1962–97 period—is associated with between
three and six fewer infants dying per thousand live births, even after con-
trolling for the eﬀects of changes in per capita income, average female ed-
ucation, and other factors. These ﬁndings suggest that, in the health di-
mension, as in the growth literature, it is harder to ﬁnd a beneﬁcial role for
ﬁnancial integration compared to trade integration for developing coun-
tries.23
In related research, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2006) analyze how
trade and ﬁnancial integration aﬀect the relationship between growth and
volatility. Running various regression models, ﬁrst Ramey and Ramey
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23. The contrast between ﬁnancial and trade openness may have important lessons for poli-
cies. While there appear to be relatively few prerequisites for deriving beneﬁts from trade
openness, obtaining beneﬁts from ﬁnancial integration requires several conditions to be in
place (this is discussed in more detail in Prasad et al. 2003, chap. 5).(1995), then several other researchers (Martin and Rogers 2000; Fatas
2002; and Hnatkovska and Loayza 2005), document that volatility and
growth are negatively correlated. The results by Kose, Prasad, and Ter-
rones (2006) suggest that trade and ﬁnancial integration weaken the nega-
tive growth-volatility relationship. Speciﬁcally, in regressions of growth
on volatility and other control variables, they ﬁnd that the estimated co-
eﬃcients on interactions between volatility and trade integration are sig-
niﬁcantly positive. In other words, countries that are more open to trade
appear to face a less severe trade-oﬀ between growth and volatility. The
authors report a similar, although slightly less robust, result for the inter-
action of ﬁnancial integration with volatility.
It is useful to note that there may be a complementary relationship be-
tween trade and ﬁnancial openness.24 For example, if a country has severe
trade barriers protecting some ineﬃcient domestic industries, then capital
inﬂows may end up being directed to those industries, thereby exacerbat-
ing the existing misallocation of resources. Thus, there is a concrete chan-
nel through which ﬁnancial openness without trade openness could lower
a country’s level of eﬃciency.
Of course, the lack of a strong and robust eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration
on economic growth does not necessarily imply that theories that make this
connection are wrong. One could argue that the theories are about the
long-run eﬀects, and most theories abstract from the nitty-gritty of insti-
tutional building, governance improvement, and other soft factors that are
necessary ingredients for the hypothesized channels to take eﬀect. Indeed,
developing countries may have little choice but to strengthen their ﬁnan-
cial linkages eventually in order to improve their growth potential in the
long run. The problem is how to manage the short-run risks apparently as-
sociated with ﬁnancial globalization. Financial integration without a
proper set of preconditions might lead to few growth beneﬁts and more
output and consumption volatility in the short run, a subject that is taken
up in the next section.
Since growth and poverty reduction are intimately related, then the
question of how ﬁnancial globalization aﬀects growth is closely linked to
the question of how ﬁnancial globalization aﬀects poverty. The fact that
the evidence on growth is indecisive almost surely implies that evidence on
poverty reduction is as well. Recent research conﬁrms this conclusion. For
example, Easterly (chap. 3 in this volume) documents that neither ﬁnancial
nor trade ﬂows have any signiﬁcant impact on poverty. On the other hand,
research by Dollar and Kraay (2002, 2004) suggests that increased trade
ﬂows could lead to higher economic growth, which in turn could reduce
poverty. Kraay (2004) provides strong evidence for the importance of eco-
nomic growth in poverty reduction, as his analysis shows that most of the
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24. This point is stressed in the September 2002 World Economic Outlook (IMF 2002).variation in changes in poverty during the 1980s and 1990s is explained by
growth in average income in developing countries. Agénor (2003) ﬁnds that
there is a nonlinear relationship between globalization and poverty. His
empirical results indicate that although globalization could reduce poverty
in countries with a higher degree of economic integration, it could have an
adverse impact on the income levels of the poor in countries with a lower
degree of integration.25 This nonlinearity stems from the fact that global-
ization has a sizable impact on the quality of institutions only beyond a cer-
tain level of trade and ﬁnancial integration, and institutions (including an
eﬃcient social safety net) play a major role in channeling the beneﬁcial
eﬀects of globalization to the poor and shielding them from its costs.
Although there has been an intensive debate about the potentially ad-
verse impact of globalization on income inequality, there is no clear em-
pirical evidence that globalization has fostered a sharp rise in worldwide
inequality. Several recent studies focus on the impact of globalization on
income inequality across countries, but these studies have yet to provide a
conclusive answer. For example, globalization could accentuate the al-
ready substantial inequality of national incomes and, in particular, lead to
stagnation of incomes and living standards in countries that do not partic-
ipate in this process. Consistent with this view, Quah (1997) has docu-
mented that there is evidence in cross-country data of a “twin peaks” phe-
nomenon whereby per capita incomes converge within each of two groups
of countries (advanced countries and globalizers) while average incomes
continue to diverge across these two groups of countries. In other words,
advanced countries and globalizers converge in terms of per capita in-
comes, and so do nonglobalizers, but these two groups diverge from each
other in terms of their average incomes. Sala-i-Martin (2002), on the other
hand, argues that a more careful analysis, using individuals rather than
countries as the units of analysis, shows that global inequality has declined
during the recent wave of globalization.
By the same token, if the institutional preconditions for ﬁnancial glob-
alization to beneﬁt growth are in place, then it is likely that ﬁnancial glob-
alization will help to alleviate poverty as well.
11.4 Financial Globalization and Macroeconomic Volatility
International ﬁnancial integration should, in principle, help countries to
reduce macroeconomic volatility. The survey presented in this section, in-
cluding some new evidence, suggests that developing countries, in particular,
have not attained this potential beneﬁt. The process of capital account liber-
alization has often been accompanied by increased vulnerability to crises.
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25. Agénor (2003) uses a weighted average of trade and ﬁnancial openness indicators as a
measure of economic integration.Globalization has heightened these risks, because ﬁnancial linkages have the
potential of amplifying the eﬀects of both real and ﬁnancial shocks.
Holding growth constant, higher macroeconomic volatility would nor-
mally be associated with an increase in inequality of income, and therefore
measures of poverty based on inequality. If the growth beneﬁts are large—
as indeed they may well be, although the evidence is clearly very mixed—
then of course increased ﬁnancial integration may increase relative poverty
measures in the short run while reducing absolute (but not necessarily rel-
ative) poverty measures in the longer run.26
11.4.1 Macroeconomic Volatility
One of the potential beneﬁts of globalization is that it should provide
better opportunities for reducing volatility by diversifying risks.27 Indeed,
these beneﬁts are presumably even greater for developing countries, which
are intrinsically subject to higher volatility because they are less diversiﬁed
than industrial economies in their production structures. However, recent
crises in some MFIs suggest that ﬁnancial integration may in fact have in-
creased volatility.
What is the overall evidence of the eﬀect of globalization on macroeco-
nomic volatility? In addressing this question, it is important to make a dis-
tinction between output and consumption volatility. In theoretical models,
the direct eﬀects of global integration on output volatility are ambiguous.
Financial integration provides access to capital that can help capital-poor
developing countries to diversify their production base. On the other hand,
rising ﬁnancial integration could also lead to increasing specialization of
production based on comparative-advantage considerations, thereby mak-
ing economies more vulnerable to shocks that are speciﬁc to industries
(Razin and Rose 1994).
Irrespective of the eﬀects on output volatility, theory suggests that ﬁ-
nancial integration should reduce consumption volatility. The ability to re-
duce ﬂuctuations in consumption is regarded as an important determinant
of economic welfare. Access to international ﬁnancial markets provides
better opportunities for countries to share macroeconomic risk and,
thereby, smooth consumption. The basic idea here is that, since output
ﬂuctuations are not perfectly correlated across countries, trade in ﬁnancial
assets can be used to delink national consumption levels from the country-
speciﬁc components of these output ﬂuctuations (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
1998, chap. 5). In an earlier paper (Prasad et al. 2004) we provide a detailed
analytical examination of this issue and show that the gains from con-
sumption smoothing are potentially very large for developing economies
(see appendix IV in that paper).
488 Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoﬀ, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose
26. Mechanically, a rise in the volatility of consumption could lead to a decrease in the
poverty head count. However, the increase in the volatility of consumption adversely aﬀects
the poor households’ welfare.
27. This subsection draws heavily on Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a).Unlike the rich empirical literature focusing on the impact of ﬁnancial
openness on economic growth, there are only a limited number of studies
analyzing the links between openness and macroeconomic volatility.
Moreover, existing studies have generally been unable to document a clear
empirical link between openness and macroeconomic volatility. Razin and
Rose (1994) study the impact of trade and ﬁnancial openness on the volatil-
ity of output, consumption, and investment for a sample of 138 countries
over the period 1950–88. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant empirical link between
openness and the volatility of these variables.
Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001) explore the sources of output volatility
using data for a sample of seventy-four countries over the period 1960–97.
They ﬁnd that a higher level of development of the domestic ﬁnancial sector
is associated with lower volatility. On the other hand, an increase in the degree
of trade openness leads to an increase in the volatility of output, especially in
developing countries. Their results indicate that neither ﬁnancial openness
nor the volatility of capital ﬂows has a signiﬁcant impact on output volatility.
Buch, Döpke, and Pierdzioch (2002) use data for twenty-ﬁve Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to
examine the link between ﬁnancial openness and output volatility. They re-
port that there is no consistent empirical relationship between ﬁnancial
openness and the volatility of output. Gavin and Hausmann (1996) study
the sources of output volatility in developing countries over the period
1970–92. They ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant positive association between
the volatility of capital ﬂows and output volatility. O’Donnell (2001) ex-
amines the eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration on the volatility of output growth
over the period 1971–94 using data for ninety-three countries. He ﬁnds that
a higher degree of ﬁnancial integration is associated with lower (higher)
output volatility in OECD (non-OECD) countries. His results also suggest
that countries with more developed ﬁnancial sectors are able to reduce out-
put volatility through ﬁnancial integration.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) examine the impact of equity mar-
ket liberalization on the volatility of output and consumption during 1980–
2000. They ﬁnd that, following equity market liberalizations, there is a sig-
niﬁcant decline in both output and consumption volatility. Capital account
openness reduces the volatility of output and consumption, but its impact is
smaller than that of equity market liberalization. However, they also report
that capital account openness increases the volatility of output and con-
sumption in emerging market countries. The September 2002 World Eco-
nomic Outlook (IMF 2002) provides some evidence indicating that ﬁnancial
openness is associated with lower output volatility in developing countries.
Since the existing literature has been quite limited and provided mostly
inconclusive evidence, this paper now presents some new evidence about
the impact of ﬁnancial integration on macroeconomic volatility. Table
11.4 examines changes in volatility for diﬀerent macroeconomic aggre-
gates over the last four decades. Consistent with evidence presented in the
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standard deviations, medians for each group of countries)
Full sample
(1960–99) 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
A. Output (Y)
Industrial countries 2.18 1.91 2.46 2.03 1.61
(0.23) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.14)
MFI economies 3.84 3.31 3.22 4.05 3.59
(0.20) (0.42) (0.37) (0.44) (0.62)
LFI economies 4.67 3.36 4.88 4.53 2.70
(0.35) (0.61) (1.01) (0.69) (0.38)
B. Income (Q)
Industrial countries 2.73 2.18 2.99 2.54 1.91
(0.34) (0.33) (0.40) (0.29) (0.30)
MFI economies 5.44 3.60 5.43 5.45 4.78
(0.50) (0.47) (0.45) (0.65) (0.72)
LFI economies 7.25 4.42 9.64 7.56 4.59
(0.84) (0.53) (1.24) (1.23) (0.54)
C. Consumption (C)
Industrial countries 2.37 1.47 2.16 1.98 1.72
(0.30) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.20)
MFI economies 5.18 4.57 4.52 4.09 4.66
(0.51) (0.49) (1.04) (0.94) (0.46)
LFI economies 6.61 5.36 7.07 7.25 5.72
(0.78) (0.58) (0.11) (0.81) (0.78)
D. Total consumption (C   G)
Industrial countries 1.86 1.38 1.84 1.58 1.38
(0.23) (0.28) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
MFI economies 4.34 3.95 4.19 3.43 4.10
(0.47) (0.51) (0.54) (0.84) (0.53)
LFI economies 6.40 4.85 6.50 6.34 4.79
(0.56) (0.55) (0.93) (0.91) (0.82)
E. Ratio of total consumption (C   G) to income (Q)
Industrial countries 0.67 0.75 0.56 0.61 0.58
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
MFI economies 0.81 0.92 0.74 0.76 0.92
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.04)
LFI economies 0.80 0.95 0.68 0.82 0.84
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.51) (0.14)
Notes: In panel E, the ratio of total consumption growth volatility to that of income growth
volatility is ﬁrst computed separately for each country. The reported numbers are the within-
group medians of those ratios. (Note that this is not the same as the ratio of the median of con-
sumption growth volatility to the median of income growth volatility.) Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses.September 2002 World Economic Outlook(IMF 2002), MFI economies on
average have lower output volatility than LFI economies. Interestingly,
there is a signiﬁcant decline in average output volatility in the 1990s for
both industrial and LFI economies but a far more modest decline for MFI
economies. The picture is similar for a broader measure of income that in-
cludes factor income ﬂows and terms-of-trade eﬀects, which are particu-
larly important for developing countries. Figure 11.8 (panel A), which
shows the evolution of the average volatility of income growth for diﬀerent
groups of countries, conﬁrms these results and shows that they are not sen-
sitive to the decade-wise breakdown of the data, although there is a pickup
in volatility for MFIs toward the end of the sample.28
Panel C of table 11.4 shows that average consumption volatility in the
1990s has declined in line with output volatility for both industrial econ-
omies and LFI economies. By contrast, for MFI economies, the volatility
of private consumption has in fact risen in the 1990s relative to the 1980s
for MFI economies. It is possible that looking at the volatility of private
consumption is misleading, because public consumption could be playing
an important smoothing role, especially in developing economies. It is
true, as shown in panel D of table 11.4, that total consumption is generally
less volatile than private consumption. However, these results conﬁrm the
pattern that, on average, consumption volatility for industrial and LFI
economies declined in the 1990s. By contrast, it increases for MFI econ-
omies over the same period. Figure 11.8 (panel B), which shows the evolu-
tion of the average volatility of total consumption growth over a ten-year
rolling window, yields a similar picture. Could this simply be a conse-
quence of higher income volatility for MFI economies?
Strikingly, for the group of MFI countries, the volatility of total con-
sumption relative to that of income has actually increased in the 1990s rel-
ative to earlier periods. Panel E of table 11.4 shows the median ratio of the
volatility of total consumption growth to that of income growth for each
group of countries. For MFI economies, this ratio increases from 0.76 in
the 1980s to 0.92 in the 1990s, while it remains essentially unchanged for
the other two groups of countries. Thus, the increase in the 1990s in the
volatility of consumption relative to that of income for the MFI economies
suggests that ﬁnancial integration has not provided better consumption-
smoothing opportunities for these economies.29
More formal econometric evidence is presented by Kose, Prasad, and
Terrones (2003a), who use measures of capital account restrictions as well
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28. The ﬁgure shows the median standard deviation of income growth for each country
group, based on standard deviations calculated for each country over a ten-year rolling win-
dow.
29. It should be noted that, despite the increase in the 1990s, the volatility of both private
and total consumption for the MFI economies is, on average, still lower than for LFI econ-
omies.A
B
Fig. 11.8 Volatility of income and consumption growth (ten-year rolling standard
deviations; medians for each group of countries); A, income; B, total consumption
Source: Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a).as gross ﬁnancial ﬂows to capture diﬀerent aspects of ﬁnancial integration,
as well as diﬀerences in the degree of integration across countries and over
time. This analysis conﬁrms the increase in the relative volatility of con-
sumption for countries that have larger ﬁnancial ﬂows, even after control-
ling for macroeconomic variables as well as country characteristics such as
trade openness and industrial structure. However, these authors also iden-
tify an important threshold eﬀect—beyond a particular level, ﬁnancial in-
tegration signiﬁcantly reduces volatility. Most developing economies, in-
cluding MFI economies, are unfortunately well below this threshold.30
Why has the relative volatility of consumption increased precisely in
those developing countries that are more open to ﬁnancial ﬂows? One ex-
planation is that positive productivity and output growth shocks during
the late 1980s and early 1990s in these countries led to consumption booms
that were willingly ﬁnanced by international investors. These consumption
booms were accentuated by the fact that many of these countries under-
took domestic ﬁnancial liberalization at the same time that they opened up
to international ﬁnancial ﬂows, thereby loosening liquidity constraints at
both the individual and the national level. When negative shocks hit these
economies, however, they rapidly lost access to international capital mar-
kets. For the ﬁnancial integration measure used in this paper, the threshold
occurs at a ratio of about 50 percent of GDP. The countries in the sample
that have a degree of ﬁnancial integration above this threshold are all in-
dustrial countries.
Consistent with this explanation, a growing literature suggests that the
procyclical nature of capital ﬂows appears to have had an adverse impact
on consumption volatility in developing economies.31One manifestation of
this procyclicality is the phenomenon of “sudden stops” of capital inﬂows
(see Calvo and Reinhart 1999). More generally, access to international cap-
ital markets has a procyclical element, which tends to generate higher out-
put volatility as well as excess consumption volatility (relative to that of in-
come). Reinhart (2002), for instance, ﬁnds that sovereign bond ratings are
procyclical. Since the spreads on bonds of developing economies are
strongly inﬂuenced by these ratings, this implies that the costs of borrow-
ing on international markets are procyclical as well. Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (2002) present more direct evidence on the procyclical behavior of
capital inﬂows.32
Financial Globalization, Growth, Volatility in Developing Countries 493
30. For the ﬁnancial integration measure used in this paper, the threshold occurs at a ratio
of about 50 percent of GDP. The countries in the sample that have a degree of ﬁnancial inte-
gration above this threshold are all industrial countries.
31. The notion of procyclicality here is that capital inﬂows are positively correlated with do-
mestic business cycle conditions in these countries.
32. The World Bank’s (2001) Global Development Finance report also ﬁnds some evidence
of such procyclicality and notes that the response of capital inﬂows is typically twice as large
when a developing country faces an adverse shock to GDP growth as when it faces a favor-
able shock. This is attributed to the fact that credit ratings are downgraded more rapidly dur-
ing adverse shocks than they are upgraded during favorable ones.11.4.2 Crises as Special Cases of Volatility
Crises can be regarded as particularly dramatic episodes of volatility. In
fact, the proliferation of ﬁnancial crises is often viewed as one of the deﬁn-
ing aspects of the intensiﬁcation of ﬁnancial globalization over the last two
decades. Furthermore, the fact that recent crises have aﬀected mainly MFI
economies has led to these phenomena being regarded as hallmarks of the
unequal distribution of globalization’s beneﬁts and risks. This raises a chal-
lenging set of questions about whether the nature of crises has changed
over time, what factors increase vulnerability to crises, and whether such
crises are an inevitable concomitant of globalization.
Some aspects of ﬁnancial crises have indeed changed over time, while in
other respects it is often déjà vu all over again. Calvo (1998) has referred to
such episodes in the latter half of the 1980s and 1990s as capital account
crises, while earlier ones are referred to as current account crises. Although
this suggests diﬀerences in the mechanics of crises, it does not necessarily
imply diﬀerences in some of their fundamental causes. Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (1999) discuss the phenomenon of “twin crises,” which involve balance-
of-payments and banking crises. These authors also make the important
point that, in the episodes that they analyze, banking-sector problems typ-
ically precede a currency crisis, which then deepens the banking crisis, acti-
vating a vicious spiral. In this vein, Krueger and Yoo (2002) conclude that
imprudent lending by the Korean banks in the early and mid-1990s, espe-
cially to the chaebols, played a signiﬁcant role in the 1997 Korean currency
crisis. Opening up to capital markets can thus exacerbate such existing do-
mestic distortions and lead to catastrophic consequences (Aizenman 2002).
One key diﬀerence in the evolution of crises is that, while the 1970s and
1980s featured crises that aﬀected both industrial and developing econ-
omies, these have become almost exclusively the preserve of developing
economies since the mid-1990s.33 This suggests either that advanced econ-
omies have been able to better protect themselves through improved poli-
cies or that the fundamental causes of crises have changed over time,
thereby increasing the relative vulnerability of developing economies. In
this context, it should be noted that, while capital ﬂows from advanced
economies to MFI economies have increased sharply, these ﬂows among
industrial economies have jumped even more sharply in recent years, as
noted earlier. Thus, at least in terms of volume of capital ﬂows, it is not ob-
vious that changes in ﬁnancial integration can by themselves be blamed for
crises in MFI economies.
Is it reasonable to accept crises as a natural feature of globalization,
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33. In fact, in the 1990s, the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis is the only signiﬁcant
one among industrial countries. The prolonged Japanese recession is in some sense a crisis,
although the protracted nature of Japan’s decline, which has not featured any sudden falls in
output, would not ﬁt the standard deﬁnition of a crisis.much as business cycles are viewed as a natural occurrence in market econ-
omies? One key diﬀerence between these phenomena is that the overall
macroeconomic costs of ﬁnancial crises are typically very large and far
more persistent. Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) document that emerg-
ing-market currency crises, which are typically accompanied by sudden
stops or reversals of external capital inﬂows, are associated with signiﬁcant
negative output eﬀects.34 Such recessions following devaluations (or large
depreciations) are also found to be much deeper in emerging markets than
in developed economies. In addition, the absence of well-functioning
safety nets can greatly exacerbate the social costs of crises, which typically
have large distributional consequences (see, e.g., Baldacci, de Mello, and
Inchauste 2002).35
What is the impact on poverty of macroeconomic volatility associated
with greater openness to trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows? Mechanically, an in-
crease in the volatility of consumption could lead to a decrease in the
poverty head count. However, the increase in the volatility of consumption
adversely aﬀects the poor households’ welfare. Recent research examines
various implications of macroeconomic volatility and ﬁnancial crises on
the dynamics of consumption and poverty in developing countries. For ex-
ample, Duygan (2004) documents that household expenditure decreased
by 5 percent on average during ﬁnancial crises in sixteen developing coun-
tries. Some recent studies focus on the permanent impact of temporary
negative income shocks on poverty. For example, Lustig (2000) concludes
that crises in Latin America adversely aﬀected the human capital of the
poor and have had a permanent impact on poverty and inequality by di-
minishing the potential of the poor to escape poverty. Agénor (2002a)
studies the asymmetric eﬀects of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and crises
on poverty. He ﬁnds that while the eﬀects of shocks to income on poverty
are quite small during periods of crisis, these shocks could decrease
poverty during expansions.36
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34. Currency crises can also aﬀect ﬁrms directly and, by exacerbating the problems of the
banking sector, can lead to a broader credit crunch, even for productive and solvent ﬁrms.
Mishkin (1999) argues that the credit crunch resulting from sharp contractions in domestic
bank credit following ﬁnancial crises has been instrumental in aggravating these crises and re-
ducing investment and economic activity. Rodrik and Velasco (2000) note that diﬃculties in
rolling over short-term debt during crisis episodes rapidly squeeze the availability of liquidity,
with immediate eﬀects on investment and output.
35. Work by Wei and Wu (2001) using Chinese regional data shows that increases in trade
openness are negatively associated with changes in inequality. However, the process of ﬁnan-
cial and trade liberalization can sometimes have negative distributional consequences within
a country, especially in the short run. Attempts to address these issues using ad hoc redis-
tributive measures can often result in distortions that adversely aﬀect long-term growth. Nev-
ertheless, given the vital need to maintain sociopolitical stability while undertaking signiﬁ-
cant reforms and liberalization, there is a need for judicious design and use of social safety
nets to protect the economically vulnerable segments of the population.
36. Recent research also studies the adverse impact of macroeconomic volatility on food se-
curity and hunger (see Barrett and Sahn 2001).11.4.3 Has Financial Globalization Intensiﬁed 
the Transmission of Volatility?
What factors have led to the rising vulnerability of developing econ-
omies to ﬁnancial crises? The risk of sudden stops or reversals of global
capital ﬂows to developing countries has increased in importance as many
developing countries now rely heavily on borrowing from foreign banks or
portfolio investment by foreign investors. These capital ﬂows are sensitive
not just to domestic conditions in the recipient countries but also to
macroeconomic conditions in industrial countries. For instance, Mody
and Taylor (2002), using an explicit disequilibrium econometric frame-
work, detect instances of “international capital crunch”—where capital
ﬂows to developing countries are curtailed by supply-side rationing that
reﬂects industrial-country conditions.37 These North-South ﬁnancial link-
ages, in addition to the real linkages described in earlier sections, represent
an additional channel through which business cycles and other shocks that
hit industrial countries can aﬀect developing countries.
The eﬀects of industrial-country macroeconomic conditions, including
the stage of the business cycle and interest rates, have diﬀerent eﬀects on
various types of capital ﬂows to emerging markets. Reinhart and Reinhart
(2001) document that net FDI ﬂows to emerging-market economies are
strongly positively correlated with U.S. business cycles. On the other hand,
bank lending to these economies is negatively correlated with U.S. cycles.
Edison and Warnock (2001) ﬁnd that portfolio equity ﬂows from the
United States to major emerging-market countries are negatively corre-
lated with both U.S. interest rates and U.S. output growth. This result is
particularly strong for ﬂows to Latin America and less so for ﬂows to Asia.
Thus, the sources of capital inﬂow for a particular MFI can greatly aﬀect
the nature of its vulnerability to the volatility of capital ﬂows arising from
industrial-country disturbances.38
The increase in cross-country ﬁnancial market correlations also indi-
cates a risk that emerging markets will be caught up in ﬁnancial market
bubbles. The rise in comovement across emerging- and industrial-country
stock markets, especially during the stock market bubble period of the late
1990s, points to the relevance of this concern. This is a particular risk for
the relatively shallow and undiversiﬁed stock markets of some emerging
economies. For instance, as noted earlier, the strong correlations between
emerging and industrial stock markets during the bubble period reﬂects the
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37. This paper examines bond, equity, and syndicated loan ﬂows to Brazil, Mexico, Korea,
and Thailand over the period 1990–2000.
38. However, notwithstanding the diﬀerences in the types of sensitivities to industrial-
country business cycle conditions, the fact still remains that FDI ﬂows are generally less
volatile and less sensitive to the factors discussed here than either portfolio ﬂows or bank
lending.preponderance of technology and telecommunication-sector stocks in the
former set of markets. It is, of course, diﬃcult to say conclusively whether
this phenomenon would have occurred even in the absence of ﬁnancial
globalization, since stock market liberalizations in these countries often
went hand in hand with their opening up to capital ﬂows.
The increasing depth of stock markets in emerging economies could al-
leviate some of these risks but, at the same time, could heighten the real
eﬀects of such ﬁnancial shocks. In this vein, Dellas and Hess (2002) ﬁnd
that a higher degree of ﬁnancial development makes emerging stock mar-
kets more susceptible to external inﬂuences (both ﬁnancial and macroeco-
nomic) and that this eﬀect remains important after controlling for capital
controls and trade linkages.39 Consequently, the eﬀects of external shocks
could be transmitted to domestic real activity through the stock market
channel.
Even the eﬀects of real shocks are often transmitted faster and ampliﬁed
through ﬁnancial channels. There is a large literature showing how pro-
ductivity, terms-of-trade, ﬁscal, and other real shocks are transmitted
through trade channels.40 Cross-country investment ﬂows, in particular,
have traditionally responded quite strongly to country-specif ﬁc shocks.41
Financial channels constitute an additional avenue through which the
eﬀects of such real shocks can be transmitted. Furthermore, since trans-
mission through ﬁnancial channels is much quicker than through real
channels, both the speed and the magnitude of international spillovers of
real shocks are considerably heightened by ﬁnancial linkages.42
Rising ﬁnancial linkages have also resulted in contagion eﬀects. Poten-
tial contagion eﬀects are likely to become more important over time as ﬁ-
nancial linkages increase and investors in search of higher returns and bet-
ter diversiﬁcation opportunities increase their share of international
holdings and, due to declines in information and transaction costs, have
access to a broader array of cross-country investment opportunities.43
There are two broad types of contagion identiﬁed in the literature—
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39. These authors use standard measures of ﬁnancial-sector development that are based on
the competitive structure and the size of the ﬁnancial intermediation sector in each country.
40. See Kouparitsas (1996); Blankenau, Kose, and Yi (2001); Kose and Riezman (2001);
and Kose (2002).
41. See Glick and Rogoﬀ (1995) for an empirical analysis of how country-speciﬁc produc-
tivity shocks aﬀect national investment and the current account. These authors show how the
responses to such shocks depend crucially on the persistence of the shocks. Kose, Otrok, and
Whiteman (2003) examine the impact of world and country-speciﬁc factors in driving ﬂuctu-
ations in output, consumption, and investment.
42. For instance, a shock to GDP growth in one country may be transmitted gradually
through trade channels but could far more quickly have an impact on economic activity in an-
other country via correlations in stock market ﬂuctuations. If the two countries were perfectly
integrated through trade and ﬁnancial linkages this outcome could, of course, simply reﬂect
an optimal risk-sharing arrangement.
43. Contagion eﬀects aside, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003b) ﬁnd that increasing ﬁnan-
cial linkages have only a small eﬀect on cross-country output and consumption correlations.fundamentals-based contagion and pure contagion. The former refers to
the transmission of shocks across national borders through real or ﬁnan-
cial linkages. In other words, while an economy may have weak funda-
mentals, it could get tipped over into a ﬁnancial crisis as a consequence of
investors’ reassessing the riskiness of investments in that country or at-
tempting to rebalance their portfolios following a crisis in another country.
Similarly, bank lending can lead to such contagion eﬀects when a crisis in
one country to which a bank has signiﬁcant exposure forces it to rebalance
its portfolio by readjusting its lending to other countries. This bank trans-
mission channel, documented in van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001), can be particularly potent since a large
fraction of bank lending to emerging markets is in the form of short-
maturity loans. While fundamentals-based contagion was once prevalent
mainly at the regional level, the Russian crisis demonstrated its much
broader international reach (Kaminsky and Reinhart 2002).44
Pure contagion, on the other hand, represents a diﬀerent kind of risk
since it can not easily be inﬂuenced by domestic policies, at least in the
short run. There is a good deal of evidence of sharp swings in international
capital ﬂows that are not obviously related to changes in fundamentals. In-
vestor behavior during these episodes, which is sometimes categorized as
herding or momentum trading, is diﬃcult to explain in the context of opti-
mizing models with full and common information. Informational asym-
metries, which are particularly rife in the context of emerging markets, ap-
pear to play an important role in this phenomenon. A related literature
suggests that pure contagion may reﬂect investors’ shifting appetite for
risk, but it is no doubt diﬃcult to disentangle such changes in risk appetite
from shifts in underlying risks themselves (Kumar and Persaud 2001).
Thus, in addition to pure contagion, ﬁnancial integration exposes devel-
oping economies to the risks associated with destabilizing investor behav-
ior that is not related to fundamentals.45
11.4.4 Some Factors That Increase Vulnerability 
to the Risks of Globalization
Empirical research indicates that the composition of capital inﬂows and
the maturity structure of external debt appear to be associated with higher
vulnerability to the risks of ﬁnancial globalization. The relative impor-
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44. Kim, Kose, and Plummer (2001) examine the roles of fundamentals-based contagion
and pure contagion during the Asian crisis.
45. The paper by Claessens and Forbes (2001) contains a compilation of essays on the
diﬀerent dimensions of contagion eﬀects. Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1999) and Forbes and
Rigobon (2001) argue that the evidence for pure contagion against the alternative of funda-
mentals-based contagion is very weak. Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2002) argue that, un-
der more general assumptions, there is greater evidence of the former type of contagion. Bay-
oumi and others (2003) ﬁnd evidence of “positive” contagion related with herding behavior
of capital inﬂows to emerging markets.tance of diﬀerent sources of ﬁnancing for domestic investment, as proxied
by the following three variables, has been shown to be positively associated
with the incidence and the severity of currency and ﬁnancial crises: the ra-
tio of bank borrowing or other debt to FDI, the shortness of the term
structure of external debt, and the share of external debt denominated in
foreign currencies.46 Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2002) ﬁnd strong evi-
dence that debt crises are more likely to occur in countries where external
debt has a short maturity.47 However, the maturity structure may not en-
tirely be a matter of choice since, as argued by these authors, countries with
weaker macroeconomic fundamentals are often forced to borrow at
shorter maturities since they do not have access to longer-maturity loans.
In addition to basic macroeconomic policies, other policy choices of a
systemic nature can also aﬀect the vulnerability of MFIs. Recent currency
crises have highlighted one of the main risks in this context. Developing
countries that attempt to maintain a relatively inﬂexible exchange rate sys-
tem often face the risk of attacks on their currencies. While various forms
of fully or partially ﬁxed exchange rate regimes can have some advantages,
the absence of supportive domestic policies can often result in an abrupt
unraveling of these regimes when adverse shocks hit the economy.
Financial integration can also aggravate the risks associated with im-
prudent ﬁscal policies. Access to world capital markets could lead to ex-
cessive borrowing that is channeled into unproductive government spend-
ing. The existence of large amounts of short-term debt denominated in
hard currencies then makes countries vulnerable to external shocks or
changes in investor sentiment. The experience of a number of MFI coun-
tries that have suﬀered the consequences of such external debt accumula-
tion points to the heightened risks of undisciplined ﬁscal policies when the
capital account is open.
Premature opening of the capital account also poses serious risks when
ﬁnancial regulation and supervision are inadequate.48 In the presence of
weakly regulated banking systems and other distortions in domestic capi-
tal markets, inﬂows of foreign capital could exacerbate the existing ineﬃ-
ciencies in these economies. For example, if domestic ﬁnancial institutions
tend to channel capital to ﬁrms with excessive risks or weak fundamentals,
ﬁnancial integration could simply lead to an intensiﬁcation of such ﬂows.49
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46. See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Rodrik and
Velasco (2000).
47. Some authors have found that the currency composition of external debt also matters.
Carlson and Hernandez (2002) note that, during the Asian crisis, countries with more yen-
denominated debt fared signiﬁcantly worse. These authors attribute this to the misalignment
between the countries’ de facto currency pegs and the denomination of their debt.
48. See Ishii et al. (2002) and Bakker and Chapple (2002).
49. Krueger and Yoo (2002) discuss the interactions of crony capitalism and capital ac-
count liberalization in setting the stage for the currency-ﬁnancial crisis in Korea. See also
Mody (2002).In turn, the eﬀects of premature capital inﬂows on the balance sheets of the
government and corporate sectors could have negative repercussions on
the health of ﬁnancial institutions in the event of adverse macroeconomic
shocks.
11.5 Conclusions
The empirical evidence has not established deﬁnitive proof that ﬁnancial
integration has enhanced growth for developing countries. Furthermore, it
may be associated with higher consumption volatility. Therefore, it may be
valuable for developing countries to experiment with diﬀerent paces and
strategies in pursuing ﬁnancial integration. Empirical evidence does sug-
gest that improving governance, in addition to sound macroeconomic
frameworks and the development of domestic ﬁnancial markets, should be
an important element of such strategies. This conclusion does not neces-
sarily imply that a country must develop a full set of sound institutions
matching the best practices in the world before embarking on ﬁnancial in-
tegration. As we emphasized in Prasad et al. (2003, chap. 5), as a country
makes progress in transparency, control of corruption, rule of law, and ﬁ-
nancial supervisory capacity, it will be in an increasingly better position to
beneﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization.
Equally important is to avoid some of the recurrent traps that countries
have fallen into as they have moved to liberalize domestic ﬁnancial markets
and engineer increased ﬁnancial globalization. If, as appears to be the case,
overly ﬁxed exchange rates are a leading determinant of ﬁnancial crises in
emerging markets, then moving to more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes
should greatly improve a country’s chances of being a winner from ﬁnan-
cial globalization even in the short term. Likewise, assuming a large exter-
nal debt burden, especially if it is of a relatively short maturity structure,
can be a damaging way to undertake ﬁnancial integration.
It is also important to stress that ﬁnancial integration is not necessarily
a variable that can be tightly controlled by policy. Capital controls, aside
from coming in myriads of forms with eﬀects that are diﬃcult to manage,
are often ineﬀective. Even in countries where they are relatively more eﬀec-
tive, such controls tend to become less so over time as the rising sophisti-
cation of international capital markets and investors, along with the global
expansion of trade, increases the opportunities for evading capital con-
trols. Some of the most consistently ﬁnancially integrated countries based
on our de facto measure—including, for example, many Latin American
countries—have often been ones where capital controls are quite stringent,
at least on paper. On the other hand, many countries in Africa oﬀer unim-
peded capital market access but have not yet succeeded in achieving a sig-
niﬁcant degree of integration.
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empirical links between ﬁnancial globalization, growth, and macroeco-
nomic volatility, one must conclude that there will almost surely be similar
ambiguity in an investigation of the links between ﬁnancial globalization
and poverty, although we have not directly examined those links in this pa-
per. Of course, in such an exercise one would ideally like to look at a
broader range of human development indicators and measures of poverty
than just income (for example, even in some countries such as Brazil that
have experienced relatively slow income growth over the past ﬁfteen years,
educational attainment levels have continued to rise).50
In addition, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the complex rela-
tionship between globalization and poverty, one has to acknowledge that
poverty is fundamentally a relative measure, which will probably gain an
entirely diﬀerent meaning as the world economy becomes more integrated
(Rogoﬀ2004). For example, if global growth continues at a rapid pace dur-
ing the next century, it is possible that by the end of the century emerging-
market economies, including China and India, could attain income levels
exceeding those of Americans today. This implies that Malthusian notions
of poverty are likely to become a distant memory in most parts of the world
as global income inexorably expands over the next century, and issues of in-
equality, rather than subsistence, will increasingly take center stage in the
poverty debate.
However, our ﬁndings support the importance of employing various
complementary policies to increase the beneﬁts of globalization for the
poor, as discussed in several other chapters of this volume. In particular,
policies encouraging labor mobility, improving access to credit and techni-
cal know-how, and establishing social safety nets seem to increase the ben-
eﬁts of increased ﬁnancial and trade integration for the poor. As discussed
in other chapters of this volume, these policies are well deﬁned in the case
of trade liberalization. For example, trade liberalization could lead to con-
traction in some previously protected industries. Policies that could help
workers move from such sectors to expanding ones could diminish the ad-
verse eﬀects on the poor in the short run while also contributing to poverty
reduction in the long run.
The results that we have highlighted in this paper provide a framework
to examine the diﬀerent channels through which the forces of ﬁnancial
globalization could aﬀect poverty and inequality outcomes. A great deal of
additional work is clearly called for to gain a better understanding of these
dimensions of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization.
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50. Ravallion (2003) argues that diﬀerences in the concept and deﬁnitions of poverty could
lead to diﬀerent conclusions about the impact of globalization on poverty and inequality.Appendix
Data Sources
Unless indicated otherwise, the primary sources for the data used in this
paper are the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The basic data sample
comprises seventy-six countries: twenty-one industrial and ﬁfty-ﬁve devel-
oping.51
Industrial countries
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Den-
mark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece
(GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands (NLD),
New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP), Swe-
den (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), the United Kingdom (GBR), and the
United States (USA).
Developing countries
These are grouped into MFI countries (numbering twenty-two) and LFI
countries (thirty-three) countries.
MFIs
Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colom-
bia (COL), Egypt (EGY), Hong Kong (HKG), India (IND), Indonesia
(IDN), Israel (ISR), Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Mo-
rocco (MAR), Pakistan (PAK), Peru (PER), the Philippines (PHL), Sin-
gapore (SGP), South Africa (ZAF), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), and
Venezuela (VEN).
LFIs
Algeria (DZA), Bangladesh (BGD), Benin (GEN), Bolivia (BOL),
Botswana (BWA), Burkina Faso (BFA), Burundi (BDI), Cameroon
(CMR), Costa Rica (CRI), Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), the Dominican Republic
(DOM), Ecuador (ECU), El Salvador (SLV), Gabon (GAB), Ghana
(GHA), Guatemala (GTM), Haiti (HTI), Honduras (HND), Jamaica
(JAM), Kenya (KEN), Mauritius (MUS), Nicaragua (NIC), Niger (NER),
Nigeria (NGA), Panama (PAN), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Paraguay
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51. The following were excluded from the analysis: small countries (those with population
below 1 million), transition economies, some oil producers, and other countries with incom-
plete or clearly unreliable data.(PRY), Senegal (SEN), Sri Lanka (LKA), Syrian Arab Republic (SYR),
Togo (TGO), Tunisia (TUN), and Uruguay (URY).
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This paper promises a comprehensive assessment of empirical evidence
about the impact of ﬁnancial integration on growth and on volatility in de-
veloping countries. Given that this complex topic is the focus of a large and
growing academic literature, not to mention perhaps an even larger and
more heated nonacademic one, the goal is ambitious. The authors cover a
lot of ground—carefully deﬁning terms, establishing basic stylized facts,
reviewing relevant economic theory, summarizing available empirical evi-
dence, and presenting ﬁndings of new empirical analysis. In my view, the
result is a thoughtful, informative, balanced, and well-written assess-
ment—most of which I agree with. There is a lot in this very useful paper.
Thus, my comments will necessarily be selective. I will begin by brieﬂy
summarizing the main conclusions. Then, taking my job as a discussant se-
riously, I will devote most of my comments to the two areas in which I see
things somewhat diﬀerently: the implications of ﬁnancial integration and
of increased capital for economic growth. Both of these are areas in which
the way that key concepts are measured aﬀects interpretation.
The authors reach two main conclusions. First, they argue that a sys-
tematic examination of available evidence suggests that it is diﬃcult to es-
tablish a robust causal relationship between the extent to which a country
is integrated with global ﬁnancial markets and its output growth. This is
one area in which I think the evidence suggests a more nuanced view, as ex-
plained below.
Second, largely on the basis of their new analysis, they argue that there
is little evidence that ﬁnancial integration has helped developing countries
to stabilize ﬂuctuations in consumption. Indeed, they ﬁnd that things may
get worse at low to moderate levels of ﬁnancial integration. They also ar-
gue that the problem may arise from the procyclicality of capital ﬂows to
developing countries. I see this section, and its focus on consumption in-
stead of output volatility, as a convincing and important contribution of
the paper. I also agree with the authors that more work is needed to better
understand when and why integration may raise volatility.
Thus, the authors conclude that “it may be valuable for developing coun-
tries to experiment with diﬀerent paces and strategies in pursuing ﬁnancial
integration.” I fully agree. While this resulting cautionary take on ﬁnancial
integration may be in accord with today’s conventional wisdom, it is a no-
table shift from the considerably more positive view of ﬁnancial integration
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search.associated with the IMF until quite recently. Further, the paper’s focus on
backing up claims with empirical evidence is refreshing in a subject area
rife with undocumented assertions.
Let me turn now to the two areas on which I have a somewhat diﬀerent
take. The ﬁrst has to do with what we mean by ﬁnancial integration. The
paper quite appropriately makes a clear distinction between de jure and de
facto measures. However, this distinction is not made explicit in the review
of existing empirical studies on which the authors base their main conclu-
sions in the section on ﬁnancial integration and growth. (This discussion
draws from Collins 2004.)
De jure measures are intended to capture the existence (and degree) of
capital controls—in other words a measure of each country’s oﬃcial pol-
icy toward capital ﬂows. The most widely used indicator is one constructed
by the IMF, which takes the value of 1 when controls exist and 0 otherwise.
An alternative, constructed by Dennis Quinn, attempts to measure the de-
gree of capital account openness, ranging from 0 (closed) to 4 (fully open).1
In contrast, de facto measures are intended to capture the actual amount
of ﬁnancial integration. Some studies use indicators based on realized cap-
ital ﬂows, while others focus on accumulated stocks.2
As the authors here point out, de jure and de facto indicators of changes
in ﬁnancial integration show much lower correlation for developing coun-
tries than they do for industrial countries. Is one concept better than the
other? I would argue that both are relevant. We are interested in whether
policy stance and changes in policy matter, as well as in the eﬀects of what-
ever capital ﬂows actually materialize. I agree with the authors of this pa-
per that actual controls and how they are enforced vary considerably
across countries. Available indicators of policy (the de jure measures) seem
quite rough, may not be very informative, and are diﬃcult to interpret.
From this perspective, it makes sense to focus, as they claim to, on de facto
indicators. But as they recognize, the de facto measures, particularly the
capital ﬂow indicators, are clearly endogenous in a growth regression,
making the causality diﬃcult to pin down conclusively.
My main point about this section of the paper, however, is that which
concept or indicator is used in empirical analyses appears to make a con-
siderable diﬀerence. Thus, distinguishing between them is very important.
The summary of existing studies presented here does not do this consis-
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1. The IMF indicator is available annually for a large sample of countries during 1966–95.
Unfortunately, the IMF replaced this single yes/no measure with a more informative, but not
directly comparable, set of indicators for particular restrictions on capital inﬂows and out-
ﬂows. The Quinn measure is available for a smaller set of countries and for selective years.
2. It is important to note that this paper (like the relevant literature) is not making a dis-
tinction between de jure as policy on the books versus de facto as the true eﬀect of that pol-
icy. Instead, the distinction is between de jure (policy on the books) versus de facto (the out-
come).tently—and indeed, most of the studies listed in table 11.3 of the paper ac-
tually use de jure measures, not the de facto ones that are the focus of the
text discussion.
The point can be made most clearly by regrouping the papers summa-
rized in table 11.3 of the paper. In doing this, I exclude the one paper that
studies eﬀects of stock market liberalizations—which I would classify as a
separate dimension of ﬁnancial integration. As shown in panel A of table
11C.1, this leaves a total of thirteen studies. Of these, twelve report results
using one or more de jure indicators, while only four report results based
on de facto indicators.3Clearly, the conclusions in the paper are dominated
by results based on de jure indicators. Panel B focuses on the results using
de jure indicators. One study that was not reviewed in the authors’ paper
has been added to the twelve. As shown, only one of twelve studies using
the IMF indicator ﬁnds clear evidence that ﬁnancial liberalization posi-
tively aﬀects growth. The evidence is somewhat more mixed using the
Quinn indicator, suggesting that the diﬃculty in ﬁnding a relationship may
be due, in part, to the coarseness of these measures. But like the IMF mea-
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Table 11C.1 Recent research on ﬁnancial integration and growth
Type of indicators
Total no. of studies De jure De facto
A. Studies in PRWK table 11.3
13 12 4
Positive eﬀect on growth?
Indicator Yes Mixed No
B. Recent research using de jure indicatorsa
IMF (12) 1 3 8
Quinn (5) 1 2 2
C. Recent research using de facto indicators
Total capital ﬂow or stockb 2 (OLS) 1 (OECD) 3 (LDC, IV)
FDI ﬂowsc 71 1
Source: Collins (2004) and author’s calculations.
Notes: PRWK   Prasad et al.’s chapter in this volume; OLS   ordinary least squares; LDC
  less developed countries; IV   instrumental variables.
aIncludes a total of thirteen studies, one of which is not in PRWK.
bIncludes three studies, all in PRWK.
cIncludes eight studies, one in PRWK.
3. Three of the studies report both.sure available since 1996, the Quinn indicator provides a limited picture of
the diﬀerences in policy stance across countries and over time.
Panel C of table 11C.1 focuses on results based on de facto indicators.
Here eight studies have been added to the three reviewed in table 11.3 of the
paper. The top line shows results in which total capital ﬂows or stocks
(usually relative to each country’s GDP) are used to proxy ﬁnancial inte-
gration. An interesting picture emerges. Studies that use simple ordinary
least squares (OLS) ﬁnd a positive, and often quite strong, link to growth.
However, it is unclear whether this reﬂects causality or simply a positive
correlation. Those that use instrumental variables in an attempt to deal
with the endogeneity of capital ﬂows fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect. The
causality may run mainly from faster growth to increased capital inﬂow.
But in at least some of these cases, the ﬁrst stage of the regression is quite
weak, and the second-stage result may simply reﬂect diﬃculties in ﬁnding
strong instruments. Finally, the last line in the table adds results in which
de facto ﬁnancial integration is measured using FDI ﬂows only. Seven out
of nine of these studies do ﬁnd a strong positive eﬀect on growth, includ-
ing some that attempt to address endogeneity. The authors of the current
paper are clearly aware of these results and seem to ﬁnd them convincing.
However, their discussion of these ﬁndings is relegated to a footnote (note
19), allowing the results based on de jure indicators to take central stage in
the text discussion.
In sum, a statement such as “if ﬁnancial integration has a positive eﬀect
on growth, it is probably not strong or robust” seems to me to be an overly
stark and potentially misleading summary of what the evidence shows. In-
stead, my reading of the existing literature is as follows: There is little evi-
dence relating available indicators of de jure ﬁnancial integration to
growth, which may reﬂect relatively uninformative indicators. Countries
that are able to attract capital inﬂows tend to grow faster, but evidence does
not suggest that this is a causal relationship. However, somewhat more sup-
port exists for a positive causal link between FDI and growth.
The second issue I would like to raise concerns the role of increased phys-
ical capital for economic growth. There is a well-known debate on this topic,
with some claiming that capital accumulation explains most of the cross-
country variation in output growth (or levels of output per capita) and oth-
ers that it is total factor productivity (TFP), not capital, that really matters.
Authors on both sides present empirical evidence to back up their claims.
And in the recent development literature, those who come down on the side
of TFP seem to be emerging on the top. The authors of this paper seem to
agree. For example, they assert that “most of the cross-country diﬀerences
in per capita incomes stem not from diﬀerences in the capital-labor ratio
butfrom diﬀerences in total factor productivity.” However, as I have argued
with Barry Bosworth, much of the diﬀerence between whether one ﬁnds
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Table 11C.2 Comparative performance: Investment and the change in the capital stock 
(eighty-four countries; dependent variable: growth in output per worker)
1960–2000 1960–80 1980–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth in physical capital per worker 0.56 0.38 0.70
(13.0) (8.9) (13.5)
Investment share per worker 0.13 0.05 0.21
(5.3) (2.5) (7.7)
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.25 0.48 0.06 0.69 0.41
Standard error 0.82 1.24 1.08 1.46 1.04 1.42
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2003).
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses; constant term is included but not reported. Growth in
capital per worker is measured as mean of annual log changes ( 100); investment per worker is mea-
sured as a share of GDP in constant national prices.
that capital accumulation is important or that it matters very little is related
to issues of measurement, which are typically ignored. My point in the re-
mainder of these remarks is not to minimize the role of TFP, which is clearly
critical to growth. Instead, it is to caution against interpretations of avail-
able evidence that suggest little or no role for capital accumulation. (This
discussion draws from Bosworth and Collins 2003. Readers are referred to
that paper for a fuller treatment and additional references.)
Consider ﬁrst the way that capital accumulation is incorporated into
growth regressions. Many of those that ﬁnd a relatively weak role for cap-
ital accumulation use each country’s average investment rate to proxy ac-
cumulation. The change in each country’s capital stock over the relevant
time period is clearly the more direct measure. We have looked at both, us-
ing data for eighty-four countries over the period from 1960 to 2000. Per-
haps surprisingly, we ﬁnd that there is a relatively low cross-country corre-
lation between average investment and change in capital stock. (Countries
with similar investment rates will have low capital accumulation if they
grow slowly, but high accumulation if they grow rapidly.) And in a regres-
sion, investment rates exhibit a much smaller and less statistically signiﬁ-
cant correlation with output growth than changes in the capital stock. This
is illustrated in table 11C.2. (We note that the point is robust to the inclu-
sion of additional right-hand-side variables.)
A number of studies use growth (or levels) accounting to relate increases
in capital to output across countries. The traditional approach puts change
in output per worker on the left-hand side and uses change in capital per
worker to measure capital input (deepening). This results in the growth de-
composition in equation (1). More recently, it has become popular to mea-
sure capital’s contribution to growth in terms of increases in the capital-output ratio. The decomposition in equation (2) shows such a decomposi-
tion.
(1)   ln        ln       (1    )   ln H      ln A
(2)   ln         ln           ln H      ln A
(Y, L, K, L, and A are GDP, labor force, physical capital, human capital,
and TFP, respectively, and   is capital’s share.)
The rationale for the second decomposition is that using capital per
worker ignores the endogeneity of capital accumulation, and that a por-
tion of any change in capital is likely to have been induced by increases
in TFP. However, as we discuss in Bosworth and Collins (2003), the as-
sumption that countries’ capital stocks adjust proportionately to all de-
viations in output growth induced by TFP seems to us extreme. Further-
more, one can recognize that changes in a country’s capital stock are
partially induced by changes in TFP without concluding that this in-
duced portion should be excluded from measures of capital’s contribu-
tion to growth. In any case, changing the deﬁnition of how to measure
capital’s contribution from that in equation (1) to that in equation (2)
hardly seems the appropriate way to resolve the underlying conceptual
dispute. And the formulation in equation (2) clearly increases the role for
TFP by scaling it upward by a factor of [1/(1 –  )] equal to 1.54 in our
analysis.
Table 11C.3reports a variance decomposition of growth in output per
worker using both formulations. As shown, the two deﬁnitions do sug-
gest very diﬀerent roles for capital accumulation. Measuring capital’s
contribution using changes in capital per worker implies that 34 percent
of the variation in growth across countries can be related to capital,
compared with 54 percent for TFP. However, measuring capital’s con-
tribution only by changes in the capital output ratio relates just 12 per-
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Table 11C.3 Variance/covariance analysis of income per worker, 1960–2000
Contribution to Y/L
Equation Physical capital Education Factor productivity
(1) K/L 0.43 0.03 0.54
(2) K/Y 0.12 0.05 0.83
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2003).
Notes: For row (1) the contribution of each factor to the growth in output per worker is de-
ﬁned as in equation (1) of the text. For row (2) contributions are deﬁned as in equation (2).cent of the output variation to capital, compared with 83 percent to
TFP.
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